Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

Crime and Work
Jeffrey Fagan
Columbia Law School, jfagan@law.columbia.edu

Richard B. Freeman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 CRIME & JUST. 225 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/284

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Jeffrey Fagan and Richard B. Freeman

Crime and Work

ABSTRACT

Crime and legal work are not mutually exclusive choices but represent a
continuum of legal and illegal income-generating activities. The links
between crime and legal work involve trade-offs among crime returns,
punishment costs, legal work opportunity costs, and tastes and preferences
regarding both types of work. Rising crime rates in the 1980s in the face
of rising incarceration rates suggest that the threat of punishment is not
the dominant cost of crime. Crime rates are inversely related to expected
legal wages, particularly among young males with limited job skills or
prospects. Recent ethnographic research shows that involvement in illegal
work often is motivated by low wages and harsh conditions in legal work.
Many criminal offenders "double up" in both legal work and crime, either
concurrently or sequentially. This overlap suggests a fluid and dynamic
interaction between legal and illegal work. Market wages and job
opportunities interact with social and legal pressures to influence decisions
to abandon crime for legal work. Explanations of the patterns of legal and
illegal work should be informed by econometric, social structural, and
labeling theories. The continuity of legal and illegal work suggests the
importance of illegal wages in research and theory on criminal decision
making.
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing today, the number of persons
incarcerated in the United States increased massively, incapacitating
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many criminals and increasing the risks of punishment for those still
active (Cohen and Canela-Cacho 1994; Mauer and Huling 1995; Levitt 1996; Blumstein and Beck 1999). These factors should have greatly
reduced the crime rate. Yet through the early 1990s, officially recorded
crime failed to decline and self-reports of victimization declined less
rapidly than expected as the incarceration rate increased (Freeman
1995; Tonry 1995; Zimring and Hawkins 1995). Although crime rates
have recently declined from their peak in the early 1990s, they remain
at high levels in the face of increasing costs of crime (Nagin 1998).
An economic explanation would turn first to the labor market determinants of the supply of young men to crime. Young men, usually outof-school people with limited job skills and employment or earnings
prospects, commit a disproportionate number of crimes (Freeman
1996a; Short 1997). For crime to persist at high levels during periods
of massive increases in incarceration and punishment risk, there must
be offsetting increases in the returns to crime, or a highly elastic supply
curve of youths to crime because of shifts in the social and economic
factors that produce criminality.
Neither the economic nor the criminological literatures offer clarity
on this question. Much of the literature before 1980 was based on
fairly simplistic concepts of criminality and also about how people divide their time between legal and illegal economic activities. For example, economists emphasized labor market participation and income returns as measures of employment but paid little or no attention to the
returns from illegal activities. But the economic lives of unemployed
people were sideshows in this literature, and the extent to which their
incomes included returns from either crime or licit informal economic
activities was poorly understood.
Criminologists also ignored crime as illegal work, or illegal income
as a motivation for criminal activity. Instead, they focused on the underlying causes of crime and unemployment and attempted to model
the two behaviors, establish their causal order, and determine their relationship to proximate individual-level causes such as family background and peer networks. Accordingly, efforts to explain the relationships between crime and legal work, or the effects of unemployment
on criminal involvement, resulted in limited tests of theory and a generally unsatisfactory literature.
These questions have been revisited more closely in the past decade
with the growing involvement of young men and women in expanded
street-level drug markets, the intensification of poverty and racial seg-
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regation, and the economic restructuring of U.S. cities (Massey and
Denton 1993; Hagan 1994; Wilson 1996). In the past, analyses of
crime and the labor market usually addressed the effects of unemployment or other labor market conditions on crime, and results typically
went in the expected direction (Freeman 1983, 1995; Witte and
Tauchen 1994; Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997). The growth of illegal
income opportunities in the 1980s, in a context of declining wages and
job losses in inner cities, increased the potential returns from crime
and perhaps altered the basic economic calculus for many young people. Thus labor market conditions and crime opportunities may influence employment in ways not considered before (Fagan 1992b; Freeman 1992; Hagedorn 1994b).
Until recently, researchers often viewed legal and illegal economic
activities as mutually exclusive. One view suggests that through processes of self or social selection, a formidable social and economic wall
separates many young men and women from the world of legal work.
This separation is the product of several forces that are concentrated
in inner-city areas and may account for their persistently higher unemployment rates. Excluded from legal work, their earnings are likely to
be heavily skewed toward informal economic activity and also toward
crime incomes.' For some, juvenile and criminal court records create
a cumulative disadvantage that may lead to being labeled as poor risks
for hiring, resulting in their exclusion from licit work (Sampson and
Laub 1993). Others may be excluded from legal work by poor job skills
or low education, a weak labor market, the racial hiring preferences of
employers, or spatial mismatches that make jobs inaccessible for urban
youths. Also, chronic unemployment and low incomes among adults in
poor neighborhoods have shaped social norms that devalue legal work
(Sullivan 1989; Anderson 1990). These dynamics leave few income options open other than public assistance, the licit informal economy, or
illegal work in crime or drug selling. Still other young men may forgo
legal work for what they perceive to be more lucrative careers in crime
or drug selling. Others shift back and forth over time, while some juggle legal and illegal economic activities at the same time (Hagedorn
1994b; Venkatesh 1997).
At the core of this view is a presumed divide between legal and illegal economic activity that leads many to choose the latter and forgo
Illegal activities are distinguished from the myriad activities of the informal economy, activities that generally involve no criminal law violations. See, e.g., Bourgois
(1989); Taylor (1990); Fagan (1992a); Freeman (1992).
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the former. Economic theory suggests that the person considering
crime compares the present value of earnings from crime, net the loss
of earnings because of being apprehended and imprisoned, with the
present value of earnings from legal work. This person also weighs the
riskiness of the crime and then makes a decision. Thus three factors
enter the calculus: legal earnings, risks and extents of penalties, and
illegal earnings.
Given the alternatives of low-wage payoffs from legal work and the
expectation of relatively high returns from income-generating criminal
activities, coupled with high incarceration risks that may appear to be
independent from crime commission, illegal activity may seem a rational choice not unlike choices made among legitimate occupational pursuits (Becker 1968; Viscusi 1986b; Freeman 1991). Whatever the origins of the decision to engage in illegal work, the onset of an illegal
career is often viewed as narrowing later economic and social options
for engaging in legal work, foretelling a lengthy career of illegal pursuits outside the social world of legal enterprise (Hagan and Palloni
1990; Freeman 1992; Sampson and Laub 1993). Nevertheless, as we
illustrate in this essay, these decisions, and the supply of young men to
crime, are far more elastic than they appear.
A. Types of Illegal Work
Any discussion of the general link between crime and work requires
a careful elaboration of the different types of crimes and their potential
relationship to legal work.2 Consider the following examples: (1) employee theft and embezzlement, white-collar crime; (2) fencing, selling
stolen goods, running a chop shop or other criminal distribution system; (3) tax evasion; (4) drug dealing, prostitution; (5) vehicle theft,
burglary, robbery; (6) kidnapping; (7) domestic violence, child abuse,
barroom brawling, driving while intoxicated. The first category requires that the criminal hold a licit job, while the second and third ordinarily are committed by people who are legally working and whose
work provides access if not motivation for their criminal activities.
People in the fourth category often are not working legally, but they
may work legally as a cover or to provide an economic backup if their
illegal work is disrupted by police activities. These jobs have the characteristics of work: they require a significant time commitment as well
as skill and commitment (Letkemann 1973). The fifth type of crime
involves small trade-offs of time between legal and illegal work. That
2We are indebted to Phil Cook for helping shape these distinctions and their meaning for this essay.
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is, for people in this category, time most likely is not an important issue in deciding whether to participate. However, the returns from
crime in categories 5 and 6 may reduce monetary incentives to work
legally. The last category requires no competition for time with legal
work, and work will be unrelated to these types of crime.
This essay is primarily concerned with offenders in categories 4 and
5. Here, the choice to engage in these crimes involves both monetary
returns and time allocation. Although these considerations may not be
totally independent, neither are they closely linked. For example, drug
dealing more closely fits Isaac Ehrlich's (1973) time allocation model
of participation in illegitimate activities. The individual divides his or
her time according to the anticipated monetary returns and the risks
of punishment. The fifth category, however, may not involve any decisions regarding time allocation and reflects the model of rationality described by Gary Becker (1968): these activities are more like gambles
(where the concerns are risks and payoffs) rather than time allocation
dilemmas. Time may still be an indirect factor in the form of timeconsuming prison terms or wage-reducing social stigma (Cook 1980).
These varying relationships between crime and work suggest different types of links, based on the two streams of criminal choice: time
allocation and risk preference. The latter ignores time allocation
(Becker 1968) and is the stronger of the two streams of thought in this
literature. We follow that logic in this essay, and we analyze the evidence in a framework that integrates punishment risk and cost, comparative monetary returns, and the social returns and costs of criminal
involvement. We also use the term "unemployment" to refer to the
condition in which an individual is not working, or jobless, regardless
of whether the person is actively seeking legal work. Whether in the
formal labor force or not, we assume that individuals are always seeking streams of income. It is the choice of the licit or illicit stream that
we examine here.
B. Continuity between Legal and Illegal Work
Both empirical research and theory challenge a deterministic view
of an exclusive relationship between crime and legal work. Rather than
dichotomous choice, economic activity for some people seems to vary
over a continuum of legal and illegal "work." This is especially true in
U.S. inner cities, where a split or "dual" labor market has distanced
adolescents and young adults from work that offers the potential for
wage growth, skill acquisition, and job stability (see, e.g., Crutchfield
[1989, 1995], and Crutchfield and Pitchford [1997], on labor stratifi-
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cation, legal work, and crime). In the absence of such opportunities,
the connection between legal and illegal markets is closer than in more
advantaged communities with broader labor markets. Several studies
show a fluid, dynamic, and complex interaction between legal and illegal work. Legal and illegal work often overlap both within time periods
and over developmental stages. Among young drug sellers, more than
one in four is also employed in legal work (Reuter, MacCoun, and
Murphy 1990), and legal wages do not necessarily decline as illegal
wages increase (Fagan 1992a, 1994).' Many drug sellers are only sporadically involved in drug sales, ducking in and out of conventional labor markets at regular intervals (Hagedorn 1994a, 1994b).
Ethnographic studies (Sullivan 1989; Williams 1989; Taylor 1990;
Padilla 1992; Adler 1993) suggest a blurring of distinctions between
legal and illegal work, and a broader conceptualization of work that
neutralizes the legal distinctions among licit and illicit income-generating activities. Individuals involved in illegal work may change their
evaluations over time of the costs and returns of such work compared
to legal pursuits, leading to career "shifts" from illegal to legal sources
of income (Shover 1985, 1995; Biernacki 1986; Tunnell 1992; Decker
and Wright 1995; Wright and Decker 1997).
Recent theoretical developments also challenge deterministic conceptions of illegal work. In part, economists and criminologists have
viewed crime and work as exclusive choices because most study designs
are single-period individual choice models that ignore within-individual changes over time (Good, Pirog-Good, and Sickles 1986; Witte
and Tauchen 1994). Beginning with Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
crime and legal work have been viewed by economists as the result of
rational choices among options that carry both costs and returns. In
their simplest form, crime and work are substitutes: each takes time
and each produces income. Making decisions to engage in one or both
behaviors is a process akin to an optimization model that reflects the
distribution of opportunities and the costs and returns of alternative
pursuits (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Stephens and Krebs 1986; Grogger
1994). Nothing in this framework argues against a vector of incomegenerating activities that involves simultaneous activities across legal
IThe "doubling up" of legal work and cocaine sales in the Fagan (1992a, 1994) and
Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) studies indicates that, for many young men, illegal work may be temporary or transitional work that supplements difficult low-wage or
otherwise unsatisfactory work. For others, legal work provides options to riskier illegal
work or perhaps broadens markets for sellers of illegal goods or services.
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boundaries, constrained by time and the distribution of opportunities,
and varying over time.
Life-course models present another challenge. In this view, individuals move in and out of activities (roles) that reflect specific developmental stages and the social and economic contingencies attached to
each stage (Sampson and Laub 1993). Behavioral trajectories of crime
or legal work change as individuals progress through predictable life
stages that expose them to changing contingencies and opportunities.
These perspectives stand in stark contrast to theories of deviance that
attempt to explain involvement in illegal behavior as the product of
criminal "traits" that are stable and enduring over the life course (see,
e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Instead, the active and fluid
movement of individuals in and out of illegal work suggests active
management of their income-producing activities and a great deal of
human perception and agency in their choices.
In this essay, we view crime and legal work as a continuum of income-generating behaviors over the life course. This leads to several
conclusions that challenge conventional views. First, the tradeoff in
wages between legal and illegal work suggests that decisions to earn
money through crimes or drug selling are rational ones. For younger
people leaving school, their entry into legal and illegal work is influenced by processes of adolescent development in the complex developmental stage of school-to-work transitions. These transitions are further
complicated in inner cities with narrow and highly segmented labor markets, recent unskilled labor surpluses, and expanded illegal markets. This
is especially salient for adolescents entering the workforce with limited
employment and earnings prospects. For workers already in the work
force, decisions to enter illegal work reflect their experiences in the legal
work force, both economic and social, and a rational economic assessment
of the risks and returns from illegal work.
Second, despite rising incarceration rates, the threat of punishment
does not seem to be a meaningful cost of crime. In earlier historical
periods, the threat of incarceration would discount the monetary returns from crime. But low wages for unskilled workers reduce the legal
opportunity costs of punishment. And, in periods of high incarceration, punishment appears to no longer be a low probability event but
a near certainty from involvement in crime. This reduces the salience
of social stigma associated with punishment, and the contingent value
of punishment costs. In addition, a criminal conviction record has an
adverse effect on future employment and earnings. The disadvantage
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of early criminal justice participation compounds over time, making
entry to legal work often difficult and limited to low-wage, low-skill
jobs.
Third, the relationship between illegal and legal work appears to be
fluid and dynamic rather than deterministic. Many legal workers are
involved concurrently in illegal economic activity. This "doubling up"
suggests an active management of income-producing activity that capitalizes on opportunities in illegal markets while maintaining the social,
legal, and economic benefits of legal work. Others move back and forth
between legal and illegal work, carefully managing the benefits and
risks of each economic sector and activity. These decisions are based
in part on wages and in part on punishment risk, and they also reflect
developmental stages in which crime and legal work have changing social value.
Fourth, although crime wages seem to be a strong factor influencing
the choice of illegal over legal work, "market" wages in legal work
compete well with illegal wages and can tip work choices toward legal
activities. The choice of illegal work seems to be contingent on the
alternative of low legal wages tied to unskilled or entry-level jobs.
However, the young males who are most prone to crime will choose
legal work over illegal work when legal wages approach a rate or "market" value for skilled labor, wages that are comparable with skilled labor. A corollary lesson is that tight labor markets may drive up wages
and create wage incentives that compete with illegal markets.
Fifth, the decision to abandon crime is influenced by legal work opportunities. Desistance is a natural process for many offenders, hastened by a combination of intrapsychic, social, and legal pressures.
Work is a central part of the process of desistance (Sampson and Laub
1993). To the extent that these exits from crime are accessible, desistance from crime can begin earlier in the life course and can proceed
with fewer setbacks and stumbles. Finally, the increasing but poorly
understood participation of women in illegal work raises additional issues about gender and the dual nature of work. 4 We explore these
themes in depth in the sections that follow.
4 Like their male counterparts, many women drug sellers "double up" in drug selling
while working legally (Fagan 1994). Some have had long careers of petty hustles and
paper frauds or prostitution work. But many others have not been involved in illegal
work until the expansion of the drug economy created new opportunities. Their pathways into illegal work are little understood and likely reflect gender issues in both the
licit and illicit economies.
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The interaction of legal and illegal work raises several questions that
are the focus of this essay. We begin Section I with a review of quantitative studies of crime, unemployment, and legal work. This review
compares macro-structural with individual studies and finds some conflicting evidence between them. We turn then to analyses of longitudinal data to illustrate the effects of criminal justice involvement on future employment and earnings. Next we examine the effects of both
legal and illegal wages on work choices. Estimates of illegal wages are
reviewed, including a close examination of income from drug dealing.
We then examine empirical studies that estimate models of econometric choices of legal and illegal work. We review several studies that integrate deterrence and econometric perspectives by including punishment costs with perceptions of monetary gains in both legal and illegal
sectors.
In this section, we address issues related to both theory and policy.
First, does illegal work draw workers away from legal work? Few studies have examined the extent to which illegal work (especially in drug
selling) draws young workers from the legal economy or whether people doing illegal work are nonparticipants in legal work. To what extent do human capital issues, as well as work opportunities, mediate
work-crime relationships? How do regional variables, including the
spatial distribution of legal employment and the redistributive functions of illegal markets, influence crime-work relationships?
This first section concludes with an analysis of the extent to which
individuals "double up" by combining legal and illegal work in an
overall strategy of income production. If workers are active decision
makers, how often do they "double up" in the legal and illegal economies? To what extent are work and crime mutually exclusive in short
periods or across years?
Section II reviews qualitative evidence on the social meaning of legal
and illegal work and on decision making with respect to choices for
generating income. In this section, we construct a social framework for
explaining decisions to shift between legal and illegal work. Recent
ethnographic research suggests several factors that influence shifts by
workers from legal to illegal work and back again. For those who have
abandoned the formal labor force for illegal work, what experiences
shaped and influenced their decisions? How have those transitions occurred? How do nonworkers view work in an era of declining legal
work opportunities? For some, the transition from legal to illegal work
may be temporary, raising questions about their experiences in illegal
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work and the factors that influence their return to legal work. How
and why do they decide to return to legal work? Still others may shift
back and forth over time. This raises a corollary question about how
"dual" careers are managed and the factors that trigger shifts into or
out of illegal work.
Section III examines empirical evidence on the abandonment of
crime for legal work. We rely primarily but not exclusively on qualitative studies of decision making by active offenders. Implications from
both life course and econometric research are discussed. Section IV
concludes the essay. First, we identify the methodological issues in
studying income-producing careers and the prospects for using incomes as a dependent variable. Then we apply perspectives from contemporary criminological theories to interpret the empirical evidence
on the crime-work relationship and conclude by offering an agenda for
both basic and policy research on crime and work.
I. Crime, Work, and Unemployment
Two often disparate literatures inform our understanding of crime and
unemployment. Economists view work, whether legal or not, as a rational decision on how to allocate one's time for income production.
It suggests that economic costs and incentives have explicit effects on
decisions to engage in legal or illegal work. Becker (1968) proposed a
risk preference model in which consumers choose legal work or crime
as a function of risk, legal wages, and criminal returns. Several variables are thought to influence this relationship. First, the expected returns from crime and the expected income from legal work establish
the economic prospects of competing alternatives. Second, the returns
from illegal work are discounted by the potential costs of criminal
sanctions from illegal work. Third, labor market variables influence the
perception of the likelihood of legal income, where loose job markets
(and high unemployment) drive down wages from legal work. Fourth,
the discount from criminal sanctions depends on whether prison is a
price worth avoiding. When crime incomes are potentially high, the
costs of incarceration may be relatively low compared to forgone illegal wages.5
IPredictions in this framework depend critically on attitudes toward risk and on
moral views. Higher criminal incomes relative to legal incomes are needed to induce
people to commit crimes when they are risk averse or are morally principled. We return
to this question later in discussing the nonmonetary returns from "lifestyle" and taste
variables.
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Criminologists tend to divide in their views of crime and work in
several ways. While many agree that crime and unemployment are
negatively associated, there is strong disagreement on both causal order and the underlying causal mechanisms. Several studies attribute
crime to unemployment (e.g., Good, Pirog-Good, and Sickles 1986),
while some economists suggest that crime causes unemployment (e.g.,
Freeman 1992). Some view the negative association between crime and
unemployment as spuriously attributable to a common underlying personality trait, such as lapses in self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990).
Some view the choice of crime as a reflection of strain resulting from
the gap between expectations and opportunities for legal work (Agnew
and White 1992). This perspective is part of an older tradition in
which unemployment and joblessness are markers of the degree of
deprivation or social inequality afflicting persons or groups (see, for a
review, Short [1997]). Other perspectives suggest that crime and work
are reciprocally related. Early involvement in crime may attenuate occupational attainment, in turn increasing the likelihood of subsequent
crime, a sequence that repeats several times over developmental stages
(Thornberry and Christenson 1984).
Still others claim that the association is conditional: avoidance of
crime is contingent on some quality of employment beyond simple entry into any occupational status. This perspective reflects the traditions
of economists who are concerned about the characteristics of work or
joblessness that promote or limit involvement in crime. These models
effectively translate structural concepts about crime causation into
models centered on individual change over the life course. For example, Sampson and Laub (1993, p. 304) claim that "employment by itself" does not increase social control but that work leads to internalized social controls through commitment and stability. Legal work also
exposes workers to the social controls of the workplace. Uggen (1996)
argues that exposure to high-quality jobs reduces criminal activity and
that stratification in job opportunities affects decisions to pursue criminal activity (see also Rosenfeld and Messner 1989).6
However, stratification of illegitimate work may also influence the
work-crime relationship. Higher positions in illegitimate occupations
may constrain mobility toward legal work, as well as reducing its apt Occupations themselves represent a stratification of opportunities, a manifestation
of Merton's concept of "legitimate means" (1938).
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peal (Matsueda et al. 1992). Thus, for both economists and criminologists, the comparative advantage of legal versus illegal work involves
both status returns and economic returns. How the two are weighed
in decisions about income has rarely been studied.
Conceptual approaches to the crime-work relationship also have differed in how work is operationalized and measured. Measures of labor
market attachments have included work participation (job participation, time spent in work, job stability), occupational status, and returns
from work. Despite the importance of the net returns of legal versus
illegal activities, illegal wages have rarely been studied, nor has status
in deviant networks been studied closely (see, for an exception, Matsueda et al. 1992). Also, because crime and legal work are often viewed
as trade-offs or time substitutes, little consideration has been given to
the simultaneity of crime and work. Accordingly, to analyze trends in
the empirical literature, we conceptualize crime and legal work from
three perspectives: crime and the legal labor market; crime, legal work,
and illegal wages; and the joint distribution of crime and legal work.
A. Crime and Unemployment
While studies at the aggregate level show some connection between
labor market variables and crime, they "fail to show a well-defined,
quantifiable linkage" (Freeman 1983, p. 106; see also Freeman 1995).
These studies take several forms: comparison of crime rates with labor
market variables (such as unemployment or wages) over time, crossarea studies that compare crime and economic characteristics across
states or countries, and individual studies that compare crime and work
variables across people, sometimes over time. For example, time-series
data allow us to examine the effects of the business cycle on crime and
to estimate what might happen to crime if overall job prospects or
wages improved or worsened.7 Freeman (1983) reviewed ten time-series studies and found crime-labor market linkages in nine. That is,
changes in labor market characteristics-employment and unemployment rates, wages for various groups in the workforce, the distribution
of jobs by skill level-influenced changes in the crime rate. Improving
work prospects were associated with declining crime rates.
However, in the three studies that also included deterrence vari'Time-series data suffer from a number of problems that make social scientists leery
of their results. For example, variables tend to move together over time, providing little
independent variation from which to infer relations. Also, the unexplained part of the
dependent variable is correlated from one year to the next.
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ables, the net effects of labor market variables were weaker than the
legal sanction variables. These studies showed a positive association
between the certainty of arrest and crime rates. When labor market
variables were added to these models, the effects of the legal sanction
variables were greater than the effects of the labor market characteristics. Freeman (1983) also reviewed fifteen cross-sectional studies and
again found weak links using income variables but more positive effects
when deterrence variables were included. However, the deterrence
studies focused more intensively on legal sanctions and the expected
costs of crime and rarely analyzed the anticipated net returns from
crime. This imbalance in models may have produced (artifactually)
stronger deterrence effects compared to market incentives (Viscusi
1986b).
Analyses with data from the 1980s suggest a clearer positive association between crime and unemployment at the aggregate level. One
reason for this may be the declining economic (wage) position of unskilled men (and increasingly, women) throughout the 1980s (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Moss and Tilly 1991; Corcoran and
Parrott 1992). These recent macro-level studies tend to locate unemployment as a cause of crime in a specific causal sequence. Reviewing
sixty-three studies, Chiricos (1987) reported a positive relationship between unemployment and property crime. Using time-series models in
which unemployment is lagged and therefore presumably antecedent
in the causal sequence leading to crime, both Cantor and Land (1985)
in the United States and Reilly and Witt (1996) in the United Kingdom reported a positive effect of unemployment on crime. Land,
McCall, and Cohen (1990) extended this finding by showing that this
relationship is stronger at the intracity level compared to intercity or
national comparisons. The Land et al. (1990) study also reduced the
persistent and extreme collinearity in aggregate measures of crime and
unemployment.
Individual-level studies suggest that relationships between crime and
unemployment differ when viewed concurrently at specific times or in
sequence over time. Both the contemporaneous and longitudinal behaviors also may be spuriously related to disadvantages in social and
developmental contexts. In several studies, adult crime and unemployment are linked (in a nonspurious relationship) from parental behavior
problems through childhood behavior problems to diminished adult
employment prospects and involvement in crime (see, e.g., Hagan
1993a). Unlike the macro-level studies, in which changes in aggregate
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unemployment rates precede increases in crime rates, these individual
level studies posit a causal sequence in which crime precedes unemployment in a sequence of developmental stages. However, when the
time units are smaller, it is unclear whether crime or unemployment is
the dominant social role and what are the (nonspurious) proximal
causes of each behavior. These studies generally lack information on
the closely timed sequences of unemployment and crime. Also, as with
most literatures, there are potentially confounding artifacts of measurement and study design that must be sorted out.
Research in the United States suggests that there are both contemporaneous and reciprocal effects between unemployment and crime.
Good, Pirog-Good, and Sickles (1986) observed employment and arrest records monthly for 300 youths aged thirteen to eighteen in a
crime prevention program in inner-city Philadelphia. They reported a
contemporaneous relationship between crime and employment in the
expected (negative) direction, where "employability" had a substantial
deterrent effect on crime. But the contemporaneous effects of crime
on employment were weaker. Put another way, prior criminal record
reduced employability, leading in turn to higher rates of crime.
Using four-wave panel data and a 1945 Philadelphia birth cohort,
Thornberry and Christenson (1984) obtained much the same result.
Unemployment had significant instantaneous effects on crime, and
crime had significant and primarily lagged effects on unemployment.
They also found that social class mediated these effects both longitudinally and cross-sectionally: the relationships were strongest for African
American youths and youths from blue-collar backgrounds. Witte and
Tauchen (1994) also used this birth cohort to estimate the effects of
wages and employment on crime using deterrence variables that are
dependent on the individual's level of criminal activity and neighborhood.' Employment (but not wages), school attendance (but not educational attainment), and increased arrest probabilities exert significant
negative effects on crime.
Sampson and Laub (1993) reanalyzed data from Glueck and
Glueck's UnravelingJuvenile Delinquency (1950), a longitudinal study
of 500 delinquents and 500 carefully matched controls, and later follow-ups (1968). The delinquent sample was constructed in 1939 and
'According to Witte and Tauchen (1994), individuals face a deterrence "schedule"
or function that relates levels of criminal activity to a probability of arrest. They assume
that there are exogenous shifts in the schedule because of differences in police policies
or budgets, or changes in the legal code. They also assume that crime and work are not
independent and frequently overlap (i.e., they are not substitute uses of time).
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consisted of white males ages ten to seventeen from several Boston
neighborhoods and who had been committed to one of two state juvenile correctional institutions. The controls were recruited from the
Boston public schools. Sampson and Laub (1993) found consistent
(negative) effects of job stability during early adult years (seventeen to
twenty-five) on annual adult arrest rates for several crime types, after
controlling for juvenile crime rates. Like several other studies, Sampson and Laub claim that "job stability is central in explaining adult desistance from crime" (1993, p. 162). Juvenile incarceration time not
only had no significant effect on crime rates as an adult, but its stigmatizing effects may "mortgage" (p. 165) opportunities for and prospects
for stable employment in adult life (p. 168). During middle adult years,
job stability during ages twenty-five to thirty-two had a significant negative effect on crime participation during later (thirty-two to forty-five)
adult years, and no other variable had a larger coefficient.
The effects of employment stigmatization from arrest differ for
young persons in the "spot" versus career labor markets. Bushway
(1996) analyzed National Youth Survey data, a longitudinal study with
a representative sample of 1,725 adolescents who were eleven to seventeen years of age in 1976 (Elliott, Huizinga, and Menard 1989). Eight
subsequent waves provided detailed histories of work and both self-reported and official crime. Within three years of an arrest, respondents
who were arrested worked seven weeks less and earned $92 per week
less than would otherwise be expected without an arrest (Bushway
1996, p. 35). Arrest, regardless how minor the offense, had adverse impacts on job stability and earnings, after controlling for individual differences in criminality, even while criminality by itself had no effect
on earnings (Bushway 1996, p. 59). But there also is an interaction with
age producing a paradoxical effect: persons below twenty-two years of
age earn more if arrested. These results are consistent with other analyses based on data with samples of British youths (Nagin and Waldfogel 1995). Evidently, the short-term effects of arrest redirect youths
from long-term or career tracks to spot or secondary labor markets
where earnings are higher in the short run but have limited wage
growth over subsequent life stages. One important limitation of this
analysis is the exclusion of African Americans from the sample, citing
concerns by Weis (1986) "about the consistency of self-reported arrest
data for African Americans" (Bushway 1996, p. 72).
For this essay, we reanalyzed the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) to assess the effects of crime and legal work in late adolescence on later work experience and incarceration. The NLSY is a
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panel study of (n = 5,332) randomly selected youths beginning in
1979, with oversamples of minority and poor youths. Comparisons by
Bushway (1996) of the NLSY and NYS samples showed nearly identical annual earnings from legal work in 1980 ($7,300) and work participation (1,480 hours) during the survey year. Unlike the NYS, the
NLSY affords estimates of illegal income. We found the predicted
positive association between crime and unemployment in the 1980
waves. Work and incarceration outcomes in 1983, 1986, and 1989 were
then estimated from the cumulative effects of incarceration, crime, and
work in the preceding intervals. Controls for demographic and human
capital variables at 1979 were included in each model. Crime measures
were available only for the 1979 wave, and the proportion of income
from illegal sources was computed. In each wave, incarceration was a
dichotomous measure based on whether the interview took place in a
jail (or prison). Human capital variables included school participation,
grade, weeks worked, and test scores from the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) (O'Neill 1990).
Table I shows that the effects of involvement in crime, detachment
from legal work, and human capital in 1979 on future incarceration
were stable and consistent over the successive waves. The percentage
of income from illegal sources significantly contributes to the probability of incarceration in later years. The higher the pay from crime (relative to legal sources) in 1980, the greater the likelihood of being incarcerated in later years. Analyzing data only for those respondents with
any illegal income in 1980, Freeman (1994, fig. 4) obtained much the
same result. The increase in the coefficient for illegal income in both
these analyses suggests an elasticity of relative rewards from crime, a
function of the decline of legitimate wages for youths over this period
(see also Grogger 1994, 1998).
Next, we estimated models for two employment outcomes in each
of the three time periods: weeks worked during the year and legal income. 9 The effects of incarceration were estimated using measures of
the number of years of incarceration from 1980 to 1982. Adolescent
involvement in crime and illegal wages in 1980 also were included. Table 2 shows the t-values for each parameter for each outcome by period. Over the three waves, incarceration produced a significant negative effect on each work outcome, even after adjusting for the
9 We also estimated a model for occupational status. The results were nearly identical
with those of the wage model and are not shown. Results are available from the authors.
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simultaneous effects of race, human capital, and intelligence. Moreover, early incarceration negatively affected later work outcomes independent of the effects of the level of crime activity in 1980. Work is
a stable behavior over a ten-year period, with weeks worked in 1980
predicting weeks worked in 1989. Labor force participation and AFQT
scores in 1980 were positively associated with work outcomes in the
later waves. However, school participation in 1980 was not a consistent
predictor of work outcomes in any subsequent period.
These trends suggest that the adverse consequences of incarceration
and exclusion from work during adolescence, compounded by human
capital advantages or deficits, endured over a ten-year period through
middle adult years for both incarceration and employment. Others report similar results. For example, Grogger (1995) also used NLSY data
to show that arrests early in adulthood reduced future legal wages in
the short term net of either "criminal capital" or human capital variables. However, any disadvantage from arrests in future legal earnings
was overtaken by other human capital deficits over a ten-year interval.
Studies with ex-offenders also show the significant effects of unemployment on crime. For example, the TARP (Transitional Aid Research Project) was a randomized experiment that tested the effects of
income supports for ex-offenders from Texas and Georgia released
from prison in 1976-77 (Berk, Rossi, and Lenihan 1980; Rossi, Berk,
and Lenihan 1980). There were no significant effects of income supports on short- or long-term returns to prison in either the Texas
(Needels 1993) or Georgia (Needels 1994) samples. However, analyses
of the pooled experimental and control samples show that both employment and (legal) earnings have strong significant effects on subsequent crimes following release from prison, even when those wages are
sporadic and well below the poverty level. For example, among the
Georgia releasees, legal earnings over a ten-year follow-up period have
a large and significant effect on criminal desistance but not on the timing (hazard) of return to prison among those who are reincarcerated
(Needels 1994). Perhaps most important is the negative effect of crime
on earnings: individuals who were not criminally active over the follow-up period earned about 40 percent more than their criminally active counterparts (34 percent). These effects are likely to be conservative estimates, since this population has relatively low human capital,
their employment is sporadic and not well paying, and their crime rates
were quite high both before and after incarceration."
10Witte (1980) obtained similar findings with a cohort of North Carolina prison releasees, even with limited information on employment activities and no data on educa-
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European studies complement research in the United States. For example, Albrecht (1984) used aggregate data from (the former West)
Germany to show that the offender rate within the unemployed youth
population actually declined from 1977-82 while overall unemployment was rising dramatically. Albrecht further disaggregated the phenomenon between short- and long-term unemployed and between
short- and long-term juvenile delinquents. While crime rates among
the long-term unemployed were unchanged, the crime rates among the
short-term unemployed actually fell during this period. Albrecht's
findings show the importance of the length of unemployment and the
effects of longer-term unemployment on crime motivation and propensity. It may be that as unemployment lengthens, expectations of a
return to work diminish, and a decay of prosocial norms ensues without the reinforcing interactions of the workplace.
Farrington et al. (1986) used interview data from the Cambridge
Study of Delinquent Development, a longitudinal study of 411 adolescent males, to show that crime rates were higher when subjects were
unemployed. However, this relationship was conditional on a number
of factors. Crime was more likely only among unemployed youths who
held attitudes more favorable to offending; those who generally were
law-abiding did not commit crimes during periods of unemployment.
The crime-unemployment relationship was stronger among youths
with histories of low status jobs. Moreover, only income-generating
crimes were more likely during periods of unemployment, but violent
crime rates did not change.
Using the concepts of embeddedness and social capital in analyses
of the Cambridge data, Hagan (1993a) argues that adult unemployment and criminality are developmental outcomes of adolescent embeddedness among delinquent peers and parental criminality. Hagan
states that "parental criminal conviction interacts with early adolescent
conviction to produce later adolescent delinquency and adult unemployment above and apart from other factors" (Hagan 1993a, pp. 48687). Accordingly, youths who are socially embedded during early childhood in social contexts of peer and parent criminality are likely to be
isolated in their adult years from legitimate employment opportunities.
Like Sampson and Laub (1993), Hagan's analysis is "deracialized"
(Lemann 1991) and shows that the processes of social embeddedness
tion. Using length of time for releasees to find a job and the wage of the first job, Witte
found that employment and earnings suppressed crime rates.
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are generic and occur even in the absence of the aggravating effects of
concentrated poverty in the contemporary U.S. context.
In a sample of young males from the Netherlands, Huurne (1988)
showed that human capital variables further mediated the effects of unemployment: having a high school degree or coming from a higher social class background mitigated the social consequences of unemployment. Ploeg (1991) obtained similar findings among 300 long-term
unemployed Dutch men twenty to fifty years of age. Unemployed men
who avoided crime prior to unemployment were unlikely to engage in
law violations, but former delinquents continued their crimes. Like the
Farrington et al. (1986) study, Ploeg concluded that unemployment is
iatrogenic with respect to crime by engendering feelings of deprivation
and injustice that precede crime.
B. Crime, Work, and Illegal Wages: Market Incentivesfor Crime
An econometric, rational choice perspective on crime and work suggests that individuals will allocate time to criminal behavior when its
returns are higher than from other activities, net of perceived punishment costs and estimates of forgone illegal wages. That is, decisions to
engage in crime suggest that offenders find the current net benefits of
crime to be positive. Not only do labor market variables account for
an individual's assessment, but factors including tastes and tolerances
for risk, preferences for work, and time allocation also are part of the
decision processes (see, e.g., Katz 1988; Taylor 1990).
One side of this calculus is returns of legal work, both personal (internal) and material. The legitimate earnings opportunities of lowskilled males deteriorated substantially from the mid-1970s through
the 1990s (Topel 1993). Real earnings fell sharply for the least educated and for those in the bottom rungs of the earnings distribution.
The exact magnitude of the decline in earnings depends on the specific
measure of earnings chosen, the deflator, years picked, the age and skill
group chosen, and so on, but drops on the order of 20 to 30 percent
that accelerated in the 1990s are a reasonable estimate (Mishel and
Bernstein 1994). Despite the putative job-creating effects of reduced
pay, there was no offsetting improvement in hours worked or
employment/population rates for the less skilled (see, e.g., table 2
above). To the contrary, hours worked over the year fell among those
in the bottom rungs of the wage distribution (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991); and employment-population rates for this group worsened
in the 1970s (though not in the 1980s [Blackburn, Bloom, and Free-
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man 1990]). The implication is that demand for less skilled male labor
plummeted, as did its attractiveness for putative workers. Indeed, consigned to a secondary labor market, workers find these jobs readily
available, but they generally pay low wages and have no permanence
or career opportunities associated with them.
On the other side of the incentive equation are criminal earnings.
However, few studies have measured illegal wages either cross-sectionally or examined changes in criminal earnings over time, and fewer
have studied the intangible "tastes" and preferences that contribute to
decisions to commit crime or work legally. There are significant obstacles to collecting accurate illegal wage data, such as valuations of noncash exchanges, including discounts in fencing stolen goods. Moreover,
since reliable official data (e.g., social security records) on illegal wages
obviously are unavailable, the few efforts in this area rely on selfreports of crime frequencies and crime incomes. We summarize them
in table 3 and review them below.
1. Income from All Crimes. Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) estimated illegal wages as the returns from an "average" offense among
prison inmates. They used National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) data on average losses by victims to estimate the earnings
from crime among prison inmates in three states (see Chaiken and
Chaiken [1982] for details on the samples)." To compute a daily wage
from crime, they estimated days free on the street per year after subtracting incarceration time and extrapolated to a full "work" year. Legal earnings were estimated at $5.78 per hour, after discounting by 20
percent to reflect taxation. Summing across eight crime categories,
they reported annualized crime incomes of $2,368 (in 1988 dollars) for
burglars and thieves with mid-level offending rates. Drug selling generated the highest returns ($1,014 per year), and business robberies the
lowest ($29). For high-rate burglars and thieves, crime incomes were
$5,711. Wilson and Abrahamse claim that legal work would actually
have paid more than crime for all but one type of offender: auto
thieves. For high-rate offenders, crime incomes exceeded work incomes for all crime types. For reasons not stated by the authors, drug
incomes (the most lucrative crime category) were omitted in the crimework wage comparisons. Overall, the analyses by Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) show that self-reported crime incomes are consistently
" Finding no published estimates of losses from forgery and theft, Wilson and Abrahamse "guessed" (1992, p. 364).
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low compared to estimated legal work incomes across all crime types
and for both mid- and high-rate offenders.
Estimates of crime incomes in general adolescent populations were
developed by Freeman (1992). A 1989 survey of Boston youths showed
self-reported annual earnings that ranged from $752 for infrequent offenders to $5,376 for youths committing crime at least once a week.
Hourly rates varied from $9.75 for frequent offenders to $88 for infrequent offenders in the Boston Youth Survey, suggesting a diminishing
return from criminal activity. Average hourly wages from crime were
$19, and estimated hourly drug wages ranged from $13 to $21. All
these estimates, including the lowest rate of $9.75 from crime, exceed
the average legal wage of $7.50 that these young men reported and
substantially exceeded their after-tax take-home pay of $5.60 per hour.
Freeman summarizes by stating that the lowest hourly pay rate from
crime of $9.75 "is seventy-three percent greater than take-home pay
from a legitimate job, whereas the $19/hour average from crime is
over three times the take-home pay" (Freeman 1992, p. 230).
In a survey of adolescents in three cities (Freeman and Holzer 1986;
Viscusi 1986b), crime incomes were $1,607 in 1980 dollars or $2,423
in 1989 dollars. However, Viscusi (1986a) adjusted these figures by a
factor of three for likely underreporting. Using this revised income estimate, crime incomes accounted for one-fourth of the total income
earned by the young men in the sample. Viscusi's model using the
three-city sample also included a crime-versus-legal income variable.
He compared illegal incomes among those who expected to earn such
incomes, with incomes of respondents with low expected illegal income. He found significant upward positive effects of expected illegal
wages on crime incomes, and the effects of these variables in regression
equations on crime incomes were roughly twice as large as the influences on the actual crime participation rate. Viscusi (1986b) also compared the differences in legal and illegal incomes as a function of
whether the respondent was working or in school. About one in five
employed youths and one in eight students committed crimes, but
their illegal incomes on average were only a fraction of their total
incomes. Because of the skew in crime incomes, crime income was a
substantial income supplement for many working youths. Among the
NOJOBSCHOOL group, incomes were evenly divided between legal
and illegal sources, but only one-half of this group participated in
crime in the study year.
Once again, those participating in crime earned substantially more
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from crime than from other sources. The results suggest that being in
school or holding a job exerted significant downward pressure on
crime participation, but only for crimes that had relatively low payoffs.
Higher-income crimes such as drug dealing provided stronger economic incentives than the labor market could bear. Yet the mixing of
crime and work appears to be a powerful trend. Legal incomes would
have to sharply exceed illegal incomes to influence work decisions: Viscusi claims that equalizing legal and illegal wages would deter only one
in six youths who participated in crime (1986a, p. 343).
Two studies measured illegal incomes using the NLSY. Although an
illegal income amount was not reported, each study developed an estimate of illegal wages by multiplying respondents' reports of what fraction of their 1979 income came from crime by their total income estimate for that year.' 2 According to Grogger (1994, 1995, 1998), crime
income in 1979 was reported by 274 of the 1,134 respondents in the
analysis (24.1 percent); mean income for this group was $1,187, an estimate comparable to Freeman's (1991) estimate of $1,607 for innercity youths in Boston. Grogger also analyzed the NLSY data to determine the effects of legal wages on crime participation among males. 3
Criminal participants worked fewer hours legally than nonparticipants
and earned a lower wage. Hourly market (legal) wages were about 8
percent higher for respondents with no crime income ($4.60) compared to those with criminal income ($4.26).
Grogger (1998) also estimated a model of legal income using four
predictors: market human capital, criminal human capital,' 4 nonlabor
income, and abilities (the AFQT). Wages increase predictably with
skill, experience, and ability and decline for those with probation sentences within one year of interview (about 15 percent lower in the following year but returning to prearrest trajectories after two years).
Models estimated for crime income show that criminal human capital
had predictably strong, positive effects. Crime incomes increased with
'2Response categories for the percentage of income from crime were set in fourths,
ranging from "none," to "about one-fourth," "about one-half," "about three-fourths,"
to "almost all."
3 Women were excluded from the analyses because of their lower crime participation
rates. Males in school or the military were excluded to limit the sample to males for
whom the primary alternative uses of time would be market work or crime. Males in jail
from 1979 to 1981 (the first three years of the panel) were excluded since they were
censored from legal work opportunities.
"4Criminal human capital was an index of criminal productivity and included prior
criminal arrests, prior criminal convictions, family members with criminal records or
convictions, and jail sentences during the ten-year analysis interval.
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lower market (legal) wages, suggesting a rational allocation of time toward the higher income-producing activity. This finding is confirmed
in Grogger's third model, an equation for market labor participation.
The effect of legal wages on market hours is large: a 10 percent increase in wages leads to an increase in labor supply of sixty-seven
hours, the equivalent of nearly two full work weeks (seventy-five
hours). And, arrests and convictions had significant negative effects on
market participation, as did criminal human capital. Finally, for each
hour of crime, market labor supply appears to decline by about 1.4
hours.
We also analyzed illegal income using the NLSY 1979 and 1980
waves and detailed measures of the frequency of eleven income-producing crimes. In linear probability (regression) models of gross illegal
income, little specialization was evident. Coefficients were significant
for five crime categories: drug sales (two types), robbery, fraud, fencing, and running numbers (gambling assistance). Incomes from marijuana and "hard drug" sales had the highest coefficients by a factor of
two compared to the next strongest predictors. But legal labor force
participation also had a significant positive association with illegal income. Consistent with Fagan's (1992a, 1992b) study of drug sellers,
involvement in multiple social networks from both work and deviant
activities seems to expand opportunities for sale of illegal goods and
services.
These studies suggest that young persons, especially males, appear
to be particularly sensitive in their time allocation decisions to market
incentives: legal work and criminal participation both are responsive to
legal wages and criminal returns in the preceding year. That is, young
males respond quite rationally to the economic returns to crime.
Moreover, illegal wages appear to be quite elastic. Grogger (1998) concludes that a 10 percent increase in wages would reduce total criminal
hours in the population by about 1.4 percent, with most of the change
due to the overall participation rate but some also to the number of
hours allocated by legally working men to crime.
While Grogger's analysis focused on individuals, Gould, Weinberg,
and Mustard (1998) have obtained strong results using aggregate data
from 352 counties over a seventeen-year period (1979-95). Using
crime data from the Uniform Crime Reports and the Current Population Survey, they used retail wages to estimate the returns of legal
work. The results showed the inverse relationship of wages with both
property and violent crime rates. The effect is stronger for property
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crimes: wage declines over the period contributed to a 13.5 percent
increase in burglary, a 7.1 percent increase in larceny, a 9.2 percent
increase in aggravated assault, and an 18 percent increase in robbery.
Three other findings in the Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard analysis
are noteworthy. First, the results are specific to young, unskilled men,
the population group most likely to commit these offenses. Second,
their analysis showed that several measures of unemployment were
small contributors to crime increases, with predicted increases ranging
from 1 to 2 percent, far lower than the predicted increases based on
market wages. Third, wage and unemployment rates had larger effects
on property crimes than on murder and rape. If market wages are the
opportunity costs of crime, then raising these costs may predict declines in the crime rate over relatively short periods of time.
2. Income from Drug Dealing. Estimates of drug dealing income deserve special attention for two reasons. First, drug incomes usually are
among the highest income-producing criminal occupations and show
more pronounced effects of the returns from illegal work. Second, the
expansion of street-level drug markets in the past decade has provided
broader opportunities for illegal work during a time of declining legal
wages and work opportunities (Johnson et al. 1990).
A survey of 186 convicted drug dealers in Washington, D.C.,
showed that "drug dealing is much more profitable on an hourly basis
than are legitimate jobs available to the same persons" (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990, p. viii). The dealers reported net (mean)
monthly income of $1,799 from drugs and $215 from other crimes,
which projects to an annual crime income of $25,000, and an implied
hourly rate of $30 (see also MacCoun and Reuter 1992).'" Freeman
(1992) points out that even if these men had worked full-time for a full
year, their illegal pay exceeded $19 per hour. These figures compare
poorly with mean legal wages of $1,046 per month or median legal
monthly earnings of $715 for the 75 percent who reported such income. Drug income rates were higher and more skewed for younger
respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four. Moreover, drug incomes
were far greater than other crime income sources and, unlike the general crime incomes reported by the Boston general adolescent population, did not diminish with frequency.
Drug incomes also exceeded legal (work) incomes by a wide margin
ISBecause the income distributions were highly skewed, Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy also report median net earnings of $721 per month from drug sales, but $2,000 per
month among the 37 percent who reported selling drugs on a daily basis.
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in a recent study of 1,003 drug users and dealers in two northern Manhattan neighborhoods in New York City (Fagan 1992a, 1994). Fagan
divided the sample into nonsellers (fewer than two days per month
selling), independent sellers, and sellers who worked in organizations
or crews. More than half the males and one-third of the females were
involved in either independent or organized drug selling during the
three-year period from 1986 to 1988. Monthly drug incomes ranged
from $2,000 for nonsellers to $4,800 for group sellers. (Nonsellers
were able to produce drug incomes through barter or informal exchanges of goods and services or through incidental or infrequent
sales.) After adjusting for average drug expenses of $1,500 per month,
net annual drug incomes ranged from $6,000 to $27,600. Over onefourth of the sellers also had legal incomes, ranging from $150 to $750
per month. These estimates included off-book work and income from
a variety of transfer payments and income supports. The percent of
total income from legal, taxed wages ranged from 7 to 33 percent. Accordingly, like the Washington, D.C., sample of male dealers, legal
work and crime were combined by many drug sellers in these two
neighborhoods. Fagan (1992a, p. 121, n. 18) notes that there remain
logical incentives for joint participation in legal work even while earning far higher incomes from drug sales: expanding networks of contacts, expectations of drug selling as a temporary occupation, and an
escape route should legal or social pressures push sellers out of the
business.
Fagan (1992a) also tested whether illegal incomes were substitutes
for legal work and whether "tastes," especially drug consumption, accounted for illegal work. The effects varied by neighborhood. Legal
work exerted a significant downward effect on total income in Washington Heights, a vigorous drug market, suggesting that legal work
may actually pose an opportunity cost relative to crime incomes. He
found no significant effect for human capital on illegal wages and concluded that the drug sellers and users were unlikely to hold legal jobs
at unskilled labor wages. But models of legal work suggested that drug
consumption (a proxy for taste/preference variables) did exert significant downward pressures on labor market participation. Nevertheless,
legal workers did have higher education levels, and the two models together indicate that drug selling was a vocation for those who were
detached from legal work and unlikely to do well in that context.
Gang members in Milwaukee reported a wide range of drug incomes
(Hagedorn 1994a). Three in four of the 236 "founding members" of
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fourteen male gangs (72 percent) had sold cocaine between 1987 and
1991. Of the ninety gang members interviewed, seventy-three were active drug sellers between 1987 and 1991. About one in four (28.7 percent) claimed they made no more money from drug selling than they
could have made from legal work at the going rates for unskilled labor
(about $6 per hour). One in five (20.7 percent) earned the equivalent
of $7-$12 per hour, and one in four (28.7 percent) reported drug incomes in the range of $13-$25 per hour, or $2,000-$4,000 per month.
Few (three of the seventy-three sellers) reported "crazy money" (more
than $10,000 per month) at any time in their drug-selling careers
(Hagedorn 1994a, p. 202). Mean monthly drug sale income was
$2,400, or about $15 per hour, compared to legal monthly incomes of
$677.6
The fungibility of legal and illegal sources of income was examined
by Huff (1996) in surveys of matched samples of gang and nongang
youths in four cities. Respondents were asked about their "reservation
wage," the net income at which they would forgo illegal wages "to go
to work legally." Nearly all illegal income, for both gang members and
neighborhood case controls, came from drug selling. Gang members
reported reservation wages comparable to the wage thresholds reported by case controls, who were "at risk" youths from the same
neighborhoods and demographic groups: $30 per hour, the same wage
levels earned by drug sellers in Washington, D.C., in the Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) study.
Most of these studies depend on self-reports of illegal incomes. Accordingly, the validity and reliability of self-reports are crucial factors
in estimating returns from crime. While Wilson and Abrahamse (1992)
claim strong validity for self-reported crime incomes, both Viscusi and
Freeman claim that crime rates and crime incomes are conservative estimates 17 since criminal behavior is seriously underreported, especially
for African American inner-city youths (Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis
1981). Thompson and Cataldo (1986) directly question the veridicality
of self-reports in their criticism of Viscusi's (1986a) analysis. What is
important for purposes of this essay is the consistency observed in the
6To better illustrate the higher expected returns from drug selling, Hagedorn
(1994a, pp. 202-3, table 2) reports: "The maximum amount of money earned monthly
by any gang member for legal income was $2,400, the mean for gang drug sales" (emphasis in original).
'7Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) draw on Chaiken and Chaiken's (1982) analyses to
suggest that self-reports and official records are stable within a factor of 1.5 (Wilson and
Abrahamse 1992, p. 361).
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effects of incarceration and early criminal involvement on later crime,
work, and incarceration, regardless of whether crime and income are
measured through official records or self-reports.
Research on returns from illegal work suggests the importance of
net returns and illegal market incentives in explaining the relationship
between crime and unemployment. Crime, especially drug selling, provides economic incentives for young inner-city males that raise income
prospects in ways that legal markets cannot. Freeman, Fagan, and Viscusi found that those with higher illegal incomes did not possess characteristics conducive to success in legal labor markets. They either
were detached from legal work or had been excluded as a result of the
accumulation of legal sanctions. Moreover, as Hagan (1993a) also
found, their greater involvement with gangs, organized drug selling,
and other illegal activities suggests their social embeddedness in contexts that close them off from conventional opportunities. In samples
of both drug dealers and general adolescent populations, illegal and total incomes were highest among those who were most active criminally, and these differed systematically from others with far lower
criminal involvement.
C. Risk and Discounted Returns from Crime
The risk and extent of penalties is the third dimension of an economic calculus of crime. The returns from crime are in part a function
of the likelihood of crime success or avoidance of punishment. Not
only are crime returns forgone if one is incarcerated, but opportunities
for legal earnings-however inferior they may be-also are lost.
Moreover, if one is incarcerated, earnings on release will be reduced
(Freeman 1992). Depending on the community, there also may be social costs from punishment through stigma and expulsion from socially
rewarding networks. Overall, then, assuming that marginal offenders
are risk averse, punishment creates a compensating differential premium for crime. In other words, punishment risk discounts the returns
from crime.
How real is this discount? Consider the following example. Since
the probability of incarceration increased in the 1980s, it is possible
that the real rewards of crime actually fell, despite the fall in legitimate
earnings for young men during the decade. 8 The magnitude of the
"SThe earnings of African American young males, who make up the majority of the
prison population in the most urbanized states, fell far more through the 1980s compared with other demographic groups (Moss and Tilly 1991; Wilson 1996). Throughout
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worsened job market opportunities for less skilled young men was sufficiently large-drops in real earnings of 20-30 percent, accelerating
in the 1990s (Mishel and Bernstein 1994)-to have at least potentially
raised their propensity to choose crime. 9 We then weigh the reduced
income probabilities against punishment risk. Using estimates from
Langan (1994), we assume that the probability of imprisonment for
robbery rose from 1974 to 1986 by 9.1 percent, and median time
served was fifteen months. This increase in incarceration would cut an
offender's legitimate earnings by about 11 percent (1.25 years X .09 1)
during this time. This falls well short of the 30 percent lower return
from legitimate work compared to crime.2" The increased rate of incarceration should, net of other factors, discount the returns from crime
(Freeman 1996b). But the decline in legitimate earnings neutralized the
costs of punishment. In the short run, there is no comparative economic advantage from avoiding punishment, even in the face of in21
creasing punishment risk.
But what about the nonmonetary costs of punishment, such as harsh
conditions, physical and sexual victimization, and social stigma on release? If incarceration carries with it substantial nonpecuniary costs,
these increased costs might still have deterred many marginal offenders
away from income-producing crimes. As we show below, the social
stigma from incarceration has weakened greatly as the proportion of
the population incarcerated increases. Nagin (1998) suggests that fear
of stigmatization, which is the foundation of the deterrent effect, may
be eroded by the escalating, very high incarceration rates of the past
twenty years. The increase in the prison population will increase the
percentage of the population with a prison record, making prison records commonplace and socially unexceptional (Nagin 1998, p. 73).
This saturation is even greater when we consider the social and spatial
concentration of prison records among nonwhite young males in cities.
Moreover, the heavy traffic between street and prison in high-crime
the 1980s, the position of these young men in the earnings distribution also fell as overall
income inequality skyrocketed (Freeman 1996a).
9 The exact magnitude of the decline in real/relative earnings depends on the specific
measure of earnings chosen, the deflator, years picked, the age and skill group chosen,
etc., but it is invariably large.
2' Langan (1994) calculated increases of 5.8 percent for burglary, 10.0 percent for larceny, and by over 20 percent for drugs. These are conservative estimates given punishment trends in the second half of the decade (Cohen and Canela-Cacho 1994; Tonry
1995; Blumstein and Beck 1999). Cohen and Canela-Cacho report that between 1975
and 1989, expected prison time for a violent crime nearly tripled.
21 A more detailed analysis would examine these tradeoffs over a work career.
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neighborhoods spreads and popularizes prison culture, even making it
perhaps a passage into adulthood, as well as an expected event of adolescence or early adulthood. The "prisonization of the streets" also
discounts or mythologizes the harsh physical conditions of prison, further discounting punishment costs for young men in the population
groups most likely to be incarcerated (see, e.g., Anderson 1997; Wilkinson and Fagan 1996).
There also is a contagious effect of involvement in illegal work that
reduces social stigma. Crime activity has external effects on the level
of crime activity of people in the same (peer) social networks: the crime
activity of one person influences the preferences toward crime of others in the same age stratum in the same community (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996). Also, increases in overall crime rates in
a community can affect decisions to engage in crime by reducing the
likelihood of apprehension for each individual (Sah 1991). Accordingly, if the psychic costs of crime are lower when others are committing more crimes, the crime decision of one person can affect crime
involvement among others (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard 1998).
Perceptions of illegal and legal earning potentials also weaken evaluations of the costs of punishment. Freeman (1996b) reported results
from surveys with inner-city youths in Boston on perceived criminal
and legitimate earnings and employment opportunities at the outset of
the 1980s and at the end of the decade. In 1980, the NBER InnerCity Youth Survey asked youths in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia
whether they thought they could make more "on the street" than in a
legitimate job. It also asked them about their perceptions of the availability of criminal opportunities. The 1989 Boston Youth Survey, conducted at the peak of the booming "Massachusetts Miracle" job market, asked the same questions. Between these dates, the proportion of
youths who reported that they could earn more on the street went up,
from 31 percent in the three cities and 41 percent in Boston in 1980
to 63 percent in Boston in 1989. Similarly, the proportion who said
they had "chances to make illegal income several times a day" roughly
doubled over the period, to reach nearly 50 percent in 1989 (Freeman
1992). Huff (1996) reports a reservation wage of $30 per hour to abandon illegal work, an unrealistically high rate but indicative of the perceived disparity among inner-city adolescents between legal and illegal
incomes.
In sum, even when incarceration costs are factored in, the hourly
rewards from crime seem to exceed legal wages for unskilled young
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men subject to many of the risk factors for crime and incarceration.
And the hourly returns from crime rose at a faster rate through the
1980s-while incarceration rates spiked-than did legal wages. Wages
count heavily in the decision to commit crimes or work legally. And,
as we show later on, the disparity between legal and illegal wages is
widened even more by increasing social rewards from crime.
D. "Doubling Up" in Crime and Work
Whether individuals "double up" in legal and illegal work addresses
several important issues. First, social embedment perspectives (Hagan
1993a) suggest that many youths are excluded from legal work as a result of their earlier involvement in crime and deviant social networks.
But active shifting between work and crime occupations suggests
greater human agency and job mobility that prior research on crime
and work had assumed. Second, the decisions to maximize incomes by
crossing legal boundaries suggest opportunities for interventions focused on investments in job skills and wages that could increase legal
occupational status if suitable jobs were available. Investments in both
skills development and job creation may bear on decisions to straddle
the two worlds of work. Third, a high rate of doubling up suggests that
an optimizing rather than satisficing model of decision making may be
operating. Satisficing models (see, e.g., Cornish and Clarke 1986,
pp. 181-82) suggest that individuals will select from among the first
few alternatives rather than consider a longer set, one of which might
provide greater returns. Satisficing may also entail nonmaterial returns,
such as excitement or status (Katz 1988). But optimization suggests
that their returns are maximized by carefully juggling and analyzing
among alternatives. Unfortunately, doubling up has been a relatively
neglected question in research on crime and unemployment. We
briefly review some of the findings.
Doubling up appears to be quite common among active offenders,
including drug sellers earning relatively high illegal incomes. Both
studies of drug dealers discussed earlier suggest doubling up. More
than one-fourth of the dealers in the Fagan (1992a) and Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) studies were involved in work and crime.
Illegal incomes were the same regardless of whether these people were
also working legally. Among the general population studies, Viscusi
(1986b) reported that about one in five employed youths committed
crimes, one in eight students reported crime in the past year, and onehalf of the NOJOBSCHOOL group committed crimes. Hagedorn
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(1994a) reported that 75 percent of active gang drug sellers working
in 1992 at the time of interview had sold drugs within the previous five
years. Work was sporadic, however: respondents said they had worked
only fourteen months in the past thirty-six in legal jobs, and only 25
percent worked in legal jobs more than twenty-four of the thirty-six
months before the interview. Hagedorn (1994b) suggested that movement between legal and illegal work was common, a decision reflecting
a combination of market (legal and illegal) conditions and other legal
and social pressures.22
Using the NLSY, we determined overlaps between crime and work.
In 1980, the year when detailed crime information was available in the
NLSY, 56.6 percent of those working reported any crime, and 20.5
percent participated in at least one income-producing crime. 3 Conversely, 74.4 percent of those involved in crime also worked, but only
33.8 percent of people reporting income-producing crimes also
worked.2 4 In fact, the percent working in 1980 in the NLSY did not
vary significantly for those involved in any crime or in income-producing crimes (Freeman 1996b). The relatively high returns from drug
selling would predict lower rates of doubling up, since drug sellers
might be unwilling to allocate their time to legal work with its lower
returns. But when drug selling is examined separately, there is little
difference in employment rates between those who did and did not sell
drugs: about 4 percent of those working sold drugs, and 4.8 percent of
those not working sold drugs. Looking in reverse, more than two in
three (69.2 percent) of the drug sellers reported also working legally
in the survey year. This is a far higher figure than the rates reported
by Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) and Fagan (1992a, 1994).
Only for those who ended up the following year in jail was there a
substantial difference in employment rates (Freeman 1996b). Without
detailed information on drug incomes, the motivations for working
while selling drugs are hard to explain.
Doubling up and job switching contradict the perspective of the
"formidable wall" that underlies much of the literature on crime and
unemployment. It suggests an active process of optimization, in which
12As pointed out by Hagedorn (1994a, p. 205), doubling up reflects the confusion of
streetcorner lives depicted by Liebow (1967) in an earlier era in Talley's Corner: "Traffic is heavy in all directions" (p. 219).
23Robbery, sale of cocaine or heroin, sale of marijuana, grand theft, petty theft, shoplifting, frauds and "cons," aid to gambling activities, fencing, burglaries, auto theft.
" Using self-reports of any income from crime in the NLSY, Grogger (1995) estimated the "doubling up" rate at 25.6 percent.
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offenders take advantage of economic opportunities that present themselves. Doubling up also reflects the coexistence of conventional and
deviant values within individuals, a contradiction noted in delinquency
research for decades (see, e.g., Cohen 1955; Matza 1964; Sullivan
1989; and Fagan 1990) and articulated in detail by Anderson (1998) as
an adaptive strategy necessary for status and survival. Hagedorn
(1994a) notes that gang members involved in drug selling had longterm attachments to women and most were "unhappily" (p. 215) enduring low-status, low-wage jobs that brought daily slights and personal humiliations. While offenders with criminal histories may face
barriers to legal work, those without such barriers face fewer obstacles
in "doubling up." Taking a second job is quite common in the United
States today, in work as diverse as skilled labor or door-to-door franchise sales. Highly decentralized drug markets offer the chance to earn
income through occasional work at hourly rates that are widely perceived to be higher than conventional second jobs. There are few commitments of time and capital, although the risks of injury and incarceration are not trivial.
Doubling up may represent not so much a problem of the rejection
of normative codes and behaviors, but of the closeness of the legal and
illegal markets in many communities. Both historical and contemporary studies of immigrant and minority communities suggest that at
both the normative and behavioral levels, the distinction between legal
and illegal activities is more of a continuum than a sharp, distinct separation (see, e.g., Chin [1995] on Chinese gangs, and Sassen-Koob
[1989] on the informal economy; see also Crutchfield [1995]). This
trend can be seen in the fine line that exists between legal and illegal
conduct in white-collar crimes and the extensive involvement of many
ethnic groups in illegal gambling and liquor distribution schemes during the era of Prohibition and beyond (see, e.g., O'Kane 1992). The
involvement of young males in these same neighborhoods today in
drug selling and other income-generating crimes may be a continuation of the interplay of crime and work that is symptomatic of their
peripheral attachment to the larger work force.
II. Crime as Work
There is a long, rich, and recently revived tradition of study of people
who think about crime as their work. Many of the early studies on
crime took an occupational perspective, emphasizing the "work" of
crime and its similarities to conventional careers. Early descriptive
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studies included Sutherland's The Professional Thief (1937), Shaw's The
Jackroller (1930), Maurer's The Big Con (1940) and Whiz Mob (1964),
Jerome Hall's Theft, Law and Society (1952), Donald Cressey's Other
Peoples Money (1953), Ned Polsky's Hustlers, Beats and Others (1967),
Bruce Jackson's A Thiefs Primer(1969), W. J. Eistadter's (1969) study
on armed robbery, Dan Waldorf's Careers in Dope (1973), and Peter
Letkemann's Crime as Work (1973). These studies showed that, as in
conventional careers, access is restricted to those with requisite background and skills and that these skills are taught and transferred in a
manner not dissimilar to apprenticeships (Letkemann 1973, p. 8).
They also show how conventional career concepts such as specialization, professionalism, apprenticeship, and work satisfaction are applicable to crime as work. More important, these early studies show the
continuities between the socialization patterns of noncriminals and
those criminals for whom crime is occupational.
Recent ethnographic research on inner-city youth has revived and
updated these early studies on crime as work. These studies show the
importance of illegal work in developmental sequences leading to adult
joblessness and criminality and the contextual influences on these developmental outcomes. This literature describes how structural
changes in neighborhoods and cities have influenced not only the income options and decisions of adolescents but also normative attitudes
toward work and the sources of status available through social networks and social roles. The decline of manufacturing work has limited
legal employment opportunities for inner-city youths2' and has occurred in contexts of concentrated poverty and narrowing job opportunities (Wilson 1987, 1996) and racial and residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993). The attractions of illegal work are reflected in
variables often unmeasured in quantitative studies on crime and work,
especially tastes and preferences.
In turn, structural changes have reshaped the composition of social
networks, the salience of informal social controls, and access to nonmaterial sources of social status (Sullivan 1989; Fagan 1992b). Fueled
by economic restructuring (Kasarda 1989), the spatial concentration of
poverty (Jargowsky and Bane 1990), and increasing residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993), these neighborhood processes are
difficult to capture in individual-level quantitative studies but are of
21In the past, manufacturing jobs have provided stable if not spectacular wages for
people living in inner cities, and especially for African Americans (Farley 1987).
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obvious importance as mediating processes that explain differences
over time and across ecological units. The continuous effects of these
changes across recent generations have contributed to new definitions
of work that effectively blur legal boundaries and choices about income.
Recent ethnographic work illustrates how the abandonment of legal
work has been accompanied by shifts in conceptions of work among
young men and women in poor areas. Anderson (1990, 1994) describes
how young males in inner-city Philadelphia regard the drug economy
as a primary source of employment and how their delinquent street
networks are their primary sources of status and social control. Similar
accounts were offered by Hagedorn (1988, 1994a, 1994b), Taylor
(1990), Moore (1992a, 1992b), and Padilla (1992, 1993). Participants
in the illegal economies in inner cities were engaged in a variety of
income-producing crimes, including drug selling, fencing, auto theft,
petty theft and fraud, commercial extortion, and residential and commercial burglary. In diverse ethnic communities in cities far apart,
young men use the language of work ("getting paid," "going to work")
to describe their crimes. 26 The confounding of the language of illegal
and legal worlds of making money seems to signal a basic shift in the
social definition of work. For the young men using this language,
money from crime is a means to commodities that offer instrumental
value as symbols of wealth and status.
Much of this illegal work is organized within ethnic enterprises
combining shared economic and cultural interests. For gangs in these
cities, there is less concern than in the past with the neighborhood or
the traditional "family" nature of gang life. Moore (1992a) shows how
gang members with limited exits from gang life remained longer in the
gang, assuming leadership roles and manipulating the gang for their
own economic advantage through perpetuation of gang culture and
ideology. Chin and Fagan (1994) and Chin (1995) describe the complex economic relationship between street gangs and adult social and
economic institutions in three Chinatown neighborhoods in New York
City. The adult groups, descendants of the tongs that were the shadow
governments in Chinatowns a century ago, are involved in both legal,
well-respected social and business activities and a variety of illegal
26See Sullivan (1989); Williams (1989); Taylor (1990); Padilla (1992); Bourgois
(1995). For example, Felix Padilla describes how gang members in a Puerto Rican Chicago neighborhood regarded low-level drug sellers in their gang as "working stiffs" who
were being exploited by other gang members.
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businesses that employ street gangs. The gangs guard territories and
act as surrogates in violently resolving conflicts and rivalries between
the adult groups. Chin (1995) concludes that the gangs prosper economically while functionally maintaining the cultural and economic
hegemony of these ambiguous adult leadership groups. Moreover, the
gangs are involved in a variety of income-producing activities, especially commercial extortion, that are shielded from legal pressures by
cultural processes that tolerate and integrate their activities into the
social fabric of everyday life in Chinatown (Chin and Fagan 1994).
Padilla (1992) describes how the new pattern of exploitation of
lower-level workers (street drug sellers) in the gang was obscured by
appeals by older gang members to gang ideology (honor, loyalty to the
gang and the neighborhood, discipline, and ethnic solidarity) combined with the lure of income. Taylor (1990), describing drug gangs
in Detroit, and Padilla (1992) also write about the use of money rather
than violence as social control within African American and Latino
drug selling gangs-if a worker steps out of line, he simply is cut off
from the business, a punishment far more salient than threats to physical safety. Drug-selling groups in these two studies superficially are
ethnic enterprises but function more substantively as economic units
with management structures oriented toward the maintenance of
profitability and efficiency. The institutionalization of these sources of
illegal work, and their competitiveness with the low-status and lowincome legal jobs left behind after deindustrialization, combine to
maintain illegal work careers long after they would have been abandoned in earlier generations.
Patterns of illegal work vary in this literature. Some abandon legal
work after a period of employment, others drift in and out of legal
work, and a few seem from the outset to choose exclusive "careers" in
illegal work. Sanchez-Jankowski (1991, p. 101), for example, claims to
have found an "entrepreneurial spirit" as the "driving force in the
work view and behavior of gang members" that pushes them to make
rational decisions to engage in the profitable worlds of drug sales or
auto theft. Hagedorn (1994b) describes how gang members drift in and
out of legal work over time, with decisions closely bundled and often
reciprocal. Hagedorn shows that among Milwaukee gang members income from drug selling far exceeded incomes from legal work. However, many in the drug economy "appeared to be on an economic
merry-go-round" (Hagedorn, 1994b, p. 205), continuing to look for
legal work, despite its lower wages, low status, danger, and part-time
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nature. But for others, the hazards and indignity of low-wage and lowstatus legal jobs discount the returns from legal work and ultimately
lead to its rejection. For example, Bourgois (1989, p. 641) claims that
drug dealers who leave legal jobs to embrace the risks and rewards of
drug selling are evidence of a "culture of resistance," preferring the
"more dignified workplace" of drug selling than the low wages and
"subtle humiliations" of secondary labor markets where racism dominates work conditions and social interactions.
Structural changes, especially the decline of manufacturing and unskilled labor, have contributed to the continuity of these views into
adulthood. Manufacturing jobs traditionally provided "exits" from
gang life and eased the transition from adolescence to adult social
roles. Millions of these jobs have disappeared since the 19 6 0s. Hagedorn (1988), Sullivan (1989), and Taylor (1990) showed how neighborhoods in the past reproduced their employment patterns in succeeding
generations through networks of job referrals. Today, what is reproduced is joblessness (Tienda 1991; Wilson 1991).
The changes in the structure of employment shaped not only job
outcomes for young adults but the outcomes of early legal problems as
well. Sullivan (1989) tells how early involvement in crimes was normative in three ethnically diverse neighborhoods, but the outcomes of arrest varied by neighborhoods. White families helped resolve disputes
informally, using family support and job networks to soften the potential stigma of arrest. With high rates of joblessness, nonwhite families
had few social buffers or job networks between them and the legal system. Not only did they lack access to job networks, but also their families were of little help when their income-producing crimes (robberies)
evoked official responses. Their disrupted job networks were unable to
mitigate legal problems or ease the school-to-work transition, contributing to the continuity of criminality and adverse legal responses. In
contrast, youths in predominantly white neighborhoods were able to
make sometimes difficult but successful escapes from adolescent crime
networks. Hagan (1993b) links this to processes of social embeddedness
that truncate future options and amplify the adverse effects of adolescent entanglements in the legal system.
These processes were institutionalized in many inner-city neighborhoods by the twin processes of deindustrialization and expansion of
drug economies. Fagan (1992b) describes the sequence of changes in
eight neighborhoods in six cities, from the decline of manufacturing
through the disruption of intergenerational job networks and social
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controls, through the institutionalization of illegal work, especially in
drug selling. The growing social isolation, resulting from concentrated
poverty and segregation, gave rise to a skewed emphasis on exaggerated displays of material wealth as a source of status (see also Anderson
1990, 1994). Motivations for the perceived higher returns from illegal
work were influenced by such tastes for quick "crazy" money (Anderson 1990) and were important components of decisions to engage in
illegal work.
The ethnographic literature is consistent with longitudinal and
other quantitative studies in several respects. Both literatures reverse
the conventional assumptions of macro-level research about the temporal ordering of crime and unemployment: most adolescents were involved in income-generating crimes well before they sought (or considered) the legal labor force. Both in the ethnographic and
longitudinal quantitative literatures, the effects of incarceration in
early adolescence carried over to adult employment and crime outcomes. The protective influence of human capital variables was evident
as well (see, e.g., Padilla's description of avoiding gang involvement).
III. Abandoning Crime for Legal Work
Many offenders drift back and forth over time between legal and illegal
work. Hagedorn (1994b), for example, shows how drug dealers move
back and forth between legal and illegal work, at times doubling up
and at other times specializing. There has been little research on how
these changes come about, how often they occur, individual differences
in shifts, or the decision processes that result in changes. However,
there has been research, much of it based on qualitative life history
analyses (Frazier 1981), on desistance from criminality. Many of these
studies describe a gradual shift over time from crime careers to relatively mundane conventional careers. Many of these studies describe
desistance from criminal careers for people who were deeply embedded in deviant social networks and who had accumulated many of the
social and human capital deficits that seem to predict adverse employment outcomes. What is instructive are the lessons regarding how the
decision heuristic changes with advancing age.
Research on "career" robbers and burglars, drug users and sellers,
and juvenile offenders describes factors and processes that influence
persistent offenders to abandon illegal work.27 In most cases, desistance
" See, e.g., Mulvey and LaRosa (1986) on juvenile offenders; Shover (1985, 1995) and
Tunnell (1992) on burglars; Cusson and Pinsonneault (1986) and Irwin (1970) on rob-
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centers around a process ascribed to "aging out," in which there is a
shift in the calculus of rewards and costs of criminality. An accumulation of aversive experiences, changes in personal circumstances, and
contingencies in neighborhoods or crime opportunities all may lead to
the decision to desist from crime. Greenberg (1977) and Biernacki
(1986) concluded that "occupational" criminality may be incompatible
with family demands or with holding down a steady (legal) job. Biernacki (1986) also showed that desistance from heroin use and attendant
crime was contingent on reversing the addict's immersion in the subcultures and social worlds of addiction and, conversely, isolation from
more conventional roles and norms. Reestablishing ties with legitimate
activities and social networks was far less difficult for those who had
not drifted very far, but more difficult for others. Having decided to
quit, successful desisters relied on social networks of nonaddicts for
support and maintenance of their new roles as well as for access to job
contacts and networks.
Fagan (1989) analyzed the desistance literature and identified the sequence of stages leading to decisions to quit and stay away from crime.
The decision to quit was often preceded by a series of adverse consequences or social sanctions from illegal work. A combination of pressures-family, legal, health, and a changing view of their former social
world-preceded the decision to quit. Some were motivated by the
threat of loss of loved ones or children, others by the threats of social
sanctions from peers or neighbors, and still others by a desire not to
face incarceration (again). Many described how their social supports
for illegal work were weaker or disappeared. Some mentioned the
physical costs: crime was more difficult to complete successfully, and
the anxieties it aroused took an increasing emotional toll (see, e.g.,
Shover 1985; Cusson and Pinsonneault 1986). For some, decisions
were "spontaneous" or were described as instant conversions to another way of life (see, e.g., Biernacki 1986; Mulvey and LaRosa 1986).
Adler's (1985, 1993) portrait of drug dealers shows the difficulty of
detaching from illicit work that extends beyond the net of legal and
illegal returns. Many drug dealers resolved and attempted to leave illegal work but found the conventional world boring. Their return to
dealing was motivated less by income than by their "withdrawal" from
the excitement of their illegal work. Biernacki also described the borebers; Adler (1985, 1993) on drug dealers; Biernacki (1986) on opiate addicts who also
were involved in a variety of income-producing crimes. See also Fagan (1989) on a conceptual model for spousal assailants.
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dom of the "straight" world for many former addicts. Transition from
illegal work became episodic, with periods of cessation increasing in
length and frequency until becoming final. But the longing for excitement (or psychological and physiological cravings, as described by
Biernacki) persisted well after the illegal behavior was abandoned.
Other voices in this literature discuss the intrinsic rewards of the
"life," while diminishing the salience of its costs. There are important
roles of tastes, intrinsic rewards, status rewards, and even emotional
thrills (Katz 1988) from illegal work and its social context in the decision to persist in crime. These factors are difficult to control or defeat
in the process of desisting from crime and may play a central role in
heuristic processes to persist in illegal work.
These rewards often provide powerful reinforcements. Fagan (1989,
p. 408) notes that "With social embedment comes the gratification of
social acceptance and social identity. The decision to end a behavior
• . . implies withdrawal from the social reinforcement it brings" and
fear of social rejection in new networks. Maintaining the decision to
quit illegal work required the construction of new social networks,
changes in physical locales, changes in self- and social identity, changes
in the functional definitions of crime, substitution of new social roles
and behaviors for the old ones (including legal work), new sources of
social reinforcement for legal work and a conventional lifestyle, and
the development of a strong belief system in the soundness of these
changes (Fagan 1989, p. 403).
However, desisters rarely mentioned economic logic in their decision making. Although desistance has been characterized as a predictable process associated with advancing age (Hirschi and Gottfredson
1983; Farrington 1986), no theoretical meaning has been attached to
the age curve. Desistance studies suggest that with age, there are
changes in the heuristic processes that offenders use to assess the costs
and benefits of crime commission (Clarke and Cornish 1985). Their
decisions were unrelated to access to legal work and were based more
on changing perceptions and evaluations of nonlegal social sanctions
from illegal work. While they perceived little change in the returns of
illegal work, desisters seemed to increase their evaluations of the potential sanction costs of their crimes: loss of loved ones, rejection by
social peers, and self-rejection. This changing evaluation of external
costs was preceded by internal changes in their self-perceptions.
Accordingly, one consequence of advancing age is a substantive shift
in the utility function underlying decisions to engage in illegal work.
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Evaluation of the costs of illegal work seems to change with age, although perceived returns from illegal work seem undiminished. Because youth participation in crime is highly responsive to legal wages
(Grogger 1995), an alternative explanation suggests that declining
crime participation with age may reflect expectations of higher earning
potential from legal work. In addition, factors born out of new social
roles (marriage, adult friend, father) and informal social control appear
to receive increasing weight with age. Perhaps also the weight accorded to tastes and "thrills" diminishes with age or is defeated by
other emotional states such as anxiety and fear. The revised calculus of
illegal work also seems to be shaped by the social contexts of everyday
life that offer new social roles, perceptions and conceptions of work,
and by changing self-identity and emotional states.
IV. Directions for Theory and Research
Research on the interactions among crime, work, and unemployment
has been limited in several ways. For example, most efforts reflect theory and methods of specific disciplines; conceptual and methodological
integration is rare. Measures are inconsistent and often indirect. Single
samples are more common than multiple samples to address period
and cohort effects. In this section, we start the summary of directions
for future research with the bad news on the limitations of current
knowledge. But even with these gaps, we identify important areas
where the literatures converge, leading to more optimistic views and
promising directions for theory and research. We conclude with an
agenda for research.
A. MethodologicalDilemmas
Specifying the crime-unemployment relationship is complicated by
a bifurcation in the empirical literature. It is difficult to compare single-period, cross-sectional models of individual choices with longitudinal studies. In the single-period studies, crime and work are presented
as alternative choices only because of the limited time period measured, overlooking variation over time. Several studies have used data
that have at least two time points (e.g., Gottfredson 1985; Good,
Pirog-Good, and Sickles 1986), while only a few others (Thornberry
and Christenson 1984; Farrington 1986; Viscusi 1986a, 1986b; Freeman 1992; Nagin and Waldfogel 1995; Bushway 1996) used panel data
extending over several years. Crime and work are events that are likely
to occur close in time. The use of annual observations data over
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lengthy time periods makes it difficult to determine whether crimes
occurred during periods of unemployment, underemployment, active
employment, or exile from the labor force.
Second, studies of crime and unemployment often omit (legal) deterrence variables that are necessary to compute how individuals discount the returns from legal work based on the potential punishment
costs. This is especially important considering that deterrence variables
are significant in macro-level studies, often outweighing the importance of labor market variables in the explanation of crime. When included, deterrence usually is measured indirectly using aggregate citywide arrest rates or probabilities (see, e.g., Good, Pirog-Good, and
Sickles [1986]; but see Witte and Tauchen [1994] for an exception),
but rarely is it measured as the individual's perceived likelihood of
sanctions. This is particularly problematic since crime rates at the
neighborhood level and arrest probabilities are not independent (Smith
1986). Accordingly, we are likely to observe both intracity and intercity
effects when multi-city samples are used, similar to the fluctuations in
labor market variables. This suggests the need for careful specification
and disaggregation of deterrence variables at the level of neighborhood
and city, and the use of hierarchical models to estimate the simultaneous effects of macro-level forces with more proximate neighborhood
effects.
Third, estimates of the work-crime association have been confounded with sampling strategies. Comparisons of general population
samples that span broad ecological areas create risks of correlationcausation confounding due to the concentration of crime and unemployment in subareas. Research with prison releasees (e.g., Berk, Rossi,
and Lenihan 1980; Witte 1980) or intervention program participants
(Good, Pirog-Good, and Sickles 1986) may have samples with truncated distributions of human capital variables and concentrations or
"ceiling rates" of other risk factors. Similarly, studies that use "street"
samples of offenders may effectively control for neighborhood factors
but also risk truncated or unmeasured human capital variables (e.g.,
limited work experiences) (see, e.g., Fagan 1992a). Studies with adult
samples may overlook the important events during adolescence that
shape later work outcomes.
Fourth, despite the central role of expected returns in economic
models of crime and unemployment, measures of illegal wages have
been weak, if measured at all. Returns from legal work have been measured in dollars, occupational status, and in labor market participation.
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But measurement of returns from illegal work is quite rare (see, for
exceptions, Viscusi 19 8 6a; Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990; Fagan 1992a, 1994; Hagedorn 1994a). Other studies use proxies or estimates (e.g., Wilson and Abrahamse 1992; Grogger 1994, 1995; Freeman 1996b). Just as labor markets vary across neighborhoods within
cities and across cities themselves, so too do illegal markets, especially
drug markets (Fagan 1992b). Measurement of illegal wages and illegal
labor market participation is critical to both sociological and econometric specification of crime decisions and the effects of unemployment. Thus there are intrinsic weaknesses in estimates of the net utility
of legal versus illegal work.
A corollary problem is evident in the measurement of crime. Not
only are the economic returns from crime not measured, but the measures of criminal activity themselves vary extensively as well. The published commentary of Thompson and Cataldo (1986) on the Viscusi
articles reflects the split among analysts on whether self-reports or official records provide more reliable measurement of crime. Like many
criminologists, the economists Thompson and Cataldo questioned the
validity of Viscusi's results based on offender self-reports of criminality. These weaknesses lead many researchers to hold their noses and
use official records of police contacts or arrests, despite their validity
problems at the individual level (Elliott and Huizinga 1986).28 Moreover, the analytic aggregations of crime measures also are quite limited. Many studies use gross, dichotomous measures of any police contact, while others use arrests. This distinction is particularly
problematic in studies of adolescents since many police contacts are
resolved informally. Many studies avoid measures of crime frequency
since their distributions often are skewed. Others fail to distinguish
types of crime, collapsing instrumental (income-producing) and "expressive" (often violent) crimes into single scales. Yet the distinction
between income-producing and other crimes is particularly critical to
models specifying actions based on estimates of returns from crime.
Official records also seem particularly ill suited to measuring returns
28Others are more cautious about using self-reports. Thompson and Cataldo (1986)
criticize Viscusi (1986b) for exclusively using self-reports. Viscusi failed to detect the absence of muggings, burglaries, and robberies in the self-reports in his sample and fails
to note the typical age-crime relationships found in a wide range of criminological studies (see, e.g., Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Yet Elliott
and Huizinga (1986), using a general population sample, claim that the extent of underreporting in arrest statistics is overwhelming for nearly all crime types, and the underreporting factor increases with the frequency of self-reported crime.
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from illegal work. Using estimators from other datasets for the value
of stolen goods or drug income ignores the importance of individual
differences in skills on the total income from crime or drug sales.
Fifth, as we discuss in more detail later on, there have been significant changes in legal and illegal labor markets over the 1980s and in
the social processes in inner-city neighborhoods that may affect decisions about crime and work (Wilson 1991, 1996). The percentage of
"unskilled" young males in inner cities grew throughout the 1980s
(Mangold 1994). The returns from both legal and illegal work changed
significantly throughout the decade, creating the possibility of shifts in
the decisions of inner-city youths toward illegal work. So too did tastes
and preferences (Fagan 1992b). These changes introduce period effects
that complicate comparisons of earlier studies with more recent efforts.
For example, manufacturing and unskilled labor jobs, the types of jobs
typically available to youths in economically distressed inner-city
neighborhoods, declined throughout this period (Kasarda 1992).
Wages for minority youths remained flat, even in a tight labor market
in the mid-1980s (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Bound and
Freeman 1992; Freeman 1992).
A variety of factors complicated access of young African American
males to legal work (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Moss and
Tilly 1991), increasing search costs and devaluing the returns from legal work. These factors also influenced the supply of young men to
crime (Freeman 1996b). Arrests and incarceration of young African
American males increased throughout the 1980s (Irwin and Austin
1994; Tonry 1995), again posing barriers to legal employment and, according to the crime-causes-unemployment view, decreasing labor
force participation. Finally, illegal markets (especially drug markets)
expanded contemporaneously with the decline of legal work in inner
cities (Fagan 1993), while informal social controls and social capital declined precipitously throughout the preceding decade (Sampson 1987;
Wilson 1987; Sampson and Wilson 1994). Accordingly, we may assume that the outcomes of work decisions reflected the growing imbalance between legal and perceived illegal returns in drug markets and
other illegal work for inner-city youths. These period-specific effects
also suggest that past research may not be applicable in the future. The
aggregate effects of high rates of joblessness may create problems of
scale that affect individual probabilities of successful outcomes. 9
29 If, e.g., crime rates increase beyond some threshold, employers may flee cities or
regions for safer environments for their workers. A perception of an unskilled labor force
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B. Theoretical Domains
Despite these gaps, there are several consistent themes for building
a foundation for theory and research. First, early involvement in crime
and incarceration as an adolescent have negative effects on employment and positive effects on crime in later adult years. Both longitudinal and ethnographic studies place delinquency before unemployment
in the sequence of developmental events over the life course. Studies
based on data from the United States, England, and other European
countries consistently identify the legacy of adolescent experiences for
future work outcomes. Sampson and Laub (1993) suggest that adolescents "mortgage" their future job stability and work outcomes through
adolescent involvement in crime but that incarceration intensifies these
effects over the life course. The importance of family context, especially parental criminality rather than parental unemployment, suggests important leverage points for intervention. The effects of high
rates of incarceration for today's adolescents, especially African Americans, may be compounded in the labor market outcomes of their children in another generation.
Second, crime does in fact appear to pay for many offenders. In the
few studies that have measured returns from crime, there are calculable
market incentives from illegal work. Perhaps more than other types of
crime, drug dealing seems to provide substantial earnings above what
legal work pays. Careers in illegal work also accord relief from the
mundane and often abusive conditions encountered by nonwhites in
white-owned businesses. The returns from what Bourgois (1989) terms
the "Horatio Alger" benefits of illegal work are difficult to calculate
but carry value even in the face of the absence of a net increase in monetary returns.3" However, the data on illegal wages are extremely limited, and extensive research is needed to analyze the role of market incentives in decisions about legal and illegal work.
Third, human capital and early work experiences are protective factors that help avoid poor job outcomes and illegal work in early adult
years. Even in models of work outcomes showing the effects of early
crime and incarceration, there are consistent positive effects from human capital variables on legal work outcomes in early adulthood. The
may also motivate employers to relocate their businesses to places with higher productivity, lower wages, more skilled workers, or less troublesome employees.
1oBourgois writes of how drug workers are willing to work under difficult working
conditions, with no benefits and substantial health and safety risks, to escape the humiliations they encounter daily in low-wage service and manufacturing jobs.
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measurement of human capital varies widely in crime and unemployment studies, and further research is needed using measures of human
capital that are truly independent from work outcomes. The use of
AFQT scores provides one such independent measure. The importance of social capital also has been shown but has received far less research attention (cf. Sampson and Laub 1993). Human and social capital overlap through job networks and referrals and through the social
embedment of work experiences in social networks where both skills
and personal relationships are exchanged.
Fourth, the effects of legal deterrence variables, or the punishment
costs of crime, are inconsistent and remain unknown pending further
study. In macro-level studies, deterrence variables appear significantly
to depress crime rates. In individual-level studies, analyses of deterrence strategies are marked by inconsistencies in conceptualization and
measurement. Deterrence rarely is disaggregated by neighborhood or
area, even though arrest probabilities vary within and across cities.
Measurement usually is limited to the threat of arrest, not of incarceration. Occupational risk also is not included, even in drug selling where
injury rates are quite substantial (Fagan and Chin 1990). There are
several dimensions of deterrence, but usually only perceived sanction
threat, or actual sanction, is included (Nagin 1998). However, incarceration risks may be tolerable or even expected and may be only a
minor discount on the net returns from illegal work. A fully specified
deterrence model should include also how important these risks are
perceived to be and whether a high risk would actually influence illegal
work decisions. It also should address the discount on informal sanctions in neighborhoods where work is infrequent and its rewards are
limited.
Finally, there are threshold effects in the structure of opportunity
that can launch social processes undermining both monetary and nonmonetary incentives to work and that support definitions of crime that
are conflated with work. In Wilson's (1996) comparison of Mexican
and African American neighborhoods in Chicago, he describes the effects of social and spatially concentrated joblessness on work and
crime. He notes a process in which the disappearance of jobs in one
generation disrupts attachments to work that are reinforced through
within- and between-generation interactions around work and income.
Under these circumstances, (legal) work is no longer a regulating social
process. The cultural isolation that develops in this vacuum shapes
definitions and conceptions of work that erode its social value. This
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"cultural disorganization" accompanies social disorganization to establish conditions in which crime can flourish. The process is reinforced
by the expansion of illegal opportunities, including both drug dealing
and everyday hustling. Cultural adaptations that develop in these circumstances support the conflation of crime and work. These adaptations to the systematic blockage of legal opportunities for income
production are intensified when they are spatially and socially concentrated in closed social networks (see, e.g., Hannerz 1969; Rainwater
1970). In this context, access to illegal opportunities furnishes material
returns and social status that is unavailable through legal work and that
compromises whatever vestiges of legal work norms that remain.
Together with recent ethnographic literature, Wilson's view helps
explain the growing isolation of inner-city adolescents from the worlds
of conventional work. With limited access to legal work, and in segregated neighborhoods with high concentrations of joblessness, alienated
views of legal work and diminished expectations for conventional success spread through social contagion and become normative (Tienda
1989). Tastes and preferences are driven by definitions of status dominated by material consumption. Violence substitutes for social control
as a means to resolve disputes and attain status (Katz 1988; Sullivan
1989; Anderson 1994), increasing the likelihood either of mortality or
incarceration. Legal work at low pay is defined poorly and carries a
negative social stigma (Bourgois 1989; Taylor 1990). With intergenerational job networks disrupted, the ability of young people to gain access to increasingly complex labor markets with limited human capital
or personal contacts foretells poor work outcomes. What starts as a
growing class of unskilled workers in isolated neighborhoods quickly
becomes a means for social contagion and rapid detachment from legal
work.
We apply the framework of Uggen (1996) and Uggen, Piliavin, and
Matsueda (1992) to discuss the theoretical implications of the workunemployment literature. Support for four broad theoretical frameworks is evident in the empirical literature, and the causal mechanisms
they specify suggest opportunities for convergence and integration. 3'
Choice, opportunity, and labeling perspectives have dynamic properties that include both structural elements and the processual elements
3' These perspectives may reflect the special conditions of disadvantaged communities
with job markets that are structurally distinct from the job markets in more advantaged
areas. There are important contextual influences on the link between legal and illegal
work at both the individual and aggregate levels.
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necessary for a theory of individual development and work outcomes.
We add to these theories borrowed from ethology to formalize observed behaviors in the search for income. We briefly review these perspectives and the prospects for theoretical synthesis.
1. Econometric Choice Models. Economic and choice theories have
been the most common basis for empirical research. They portray
crime as the result of a decision to seek the (perceived) higher rewards
of the illegal labor market compared to the legal market, adjusted for
the potential punishment costs of illegal behavior (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1973). Rational choice theorists (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986) extended this model by assuming that offenders
in fact do proceed according to a heuristic process, but this heuristic
model includes elements of income satisficing as well as income optimization. Others (Block and Heineke 1975) claimed that a process of
neutralization is necessary to permit ethical decisions to engage in
crime and that psychic rewards also figure in the decision to engage in
illegal work (see, e.g., Katz 1988; Grasmick and Bursik 1990). Choice
theorists also have used economic choice models to explain deterrence
(Miller and Anderson 1986).
There is some support for the economic position in this empirical
literature, and choice models have obvious importance in a theoretical
model of work decisions. The role of market incentives suggests that
crime indeed pays compared to the types of work available to criminal
offenders, particularly for drug sales. There are important roles for status and psychic payoffs from illegal work, particularly in social contexts
where crime participation is high, labor force participation is low, and
crime provides a skewed form of "occupational status." That is, the
status and personal costs of legal work motivate selection of illegal
work. Participation in illegal work also may reflect the proximity of
illegal work compared to low-wage legal work and a choice to minimize search time or circumvent lengthy job queues.
Accordingly, the decision to select illegal work may indeed reflect
its net benefits and structural features of labor markets for urban
youths and young adults. If the distribution of opportunities is uneven
and skewed away from inner-city urban areas, decisions to seek illegal
work may reflect the income-satisficing model of decision making
(Cornish and Clarke 1986). Moreover, the role of deterrence in economic choice seems clear, yet it has been studied inconsistently. Sociological tests of deterrence often focus on the risks of deviance, discounting the rewards of offending. Even so, there is only weak support
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for the deterrence components of this model compared to criminal rewards (e.g., Piliavin et al. 1986).
2. Opportunity Structures. According to opportunity theories, difficulty in attaining conventional goals-affluence, social status-creates conditions of anomie or strain, leading to criminal pursuits (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Agnew and White 1992; Paternoster and
Mazerolle 1994). These themes are evident in the ethnographic literature. Young males and females have turned to a wide variety of informal economic activities, some of them illegal, as stable and well-paying
legal jobs became more scarce. Uggen (1996) calls them innovators
who reject low-wage legal work and embrace illegal work in pursuit of
the twin goals of affluence and social status, while Sanchez-Jankowski
(1991) notes their independent spirit of entrepreneurship. Throughout
the ethnographic literature, young males in different neighborhoods
and ethnic groups report the coexistence of conventional and nonconventional goals, signs that their frustrations with the legal labor market
in part motivate their decisions to seek illegal work.
Barriers to conventional success may result from job scarcity or access to work that provides status and monetary reward. In some neighborhoods, the distribution of opportunities is such that unemployment
is as common as employment among nonwhite adolescents, and there
are more illegal than legal opportunities. Wages reflect these persistent
trends (Bound and Freeman 1992). Wages for unskilled workers in the
United States are far lower than in other industrialized Western countries, and this disparity has grown steadily for nearly three decades
(Freeman 1994). Legal opportunities appear to be low-status, low-paying, and generally exploited labor (Padilla 1992; Hagedorn 1994a), and
expansions in the workforce appear to be in "contingent" jobs rather
than "permanent" ones (Freeman 1994). The effects of declining
wages and opportunities are strongest for unskilled workers, the group
of working-age men with the highest crime rates.
In these conditions, detachment from legal work has become normative; illegal activities are defined as "work," and the returns from crime
as "getting paid" (Sullivan 1989). Pursuing "conventional" goals
through illegal work has become dangerously close to becoming institutionalized in an oppositional culture, just as legal work may become
the exception for a "growing underclass of the unskilled" (Wacquant
and Wilson 1989; Mangold 1994). Recent studies in Canada suggest
similar dynamics (Baron and Hartnagel 1997; Hagan and McCarthy
1997). Accordingly, the importance of the balance of opportunities for

Jeffrey Fagan and Richard B. Freeman

the decision to seek illegal work is another central feature of the crime
and unemployment relationship.
3. Labeling. The exclusion of incarcerated young offenders from
legal work is evident in the longitudinal studies of Sampson and Laub
(1993) and Freeman (1992). In the labeling perspective, early involvement in the criminal justice system has sustaining negative effects on
future behavior. The mechanisms are compounding. Excluded from legal work by criminal records, young offenders in turn may come to
define themselves through that label. This may lead to further embedment in deviant networks and a deepening self-concept as an outsider to legal work. Accordingly, the label has both exogenous effects
for employers and psychological effects for the individual seeking
work. Such labels may attach and persist even before individuals seek
access to legal work. Through parental criminality, adolescents may be
embedded in social networks that are outside conventional job networks (Hagan 1993a), leading to early criminal involvement and the
attachment of a legal sanction that in turn may exclude young people
from future legal work.
4. Work and Crime: A ForagingModel. Treating the decision to engage in crime as a dichotomous choice between legal and illegal work
misses an important aspect of criminal activity. Because most offenders
work outside of criminal organizations, and because the U.S. job market is characterized by considerable mobility and flexibility, it is easy
to combine work with crime at one time or to move between the two
activities over time. These decisions are simplified and facilitated not
only by labor mobility but also by the distribution of criminal opportunities and restraints in neighborhoods where crime often is concentrated (Sampson 1987; Massey and Eggers 1990; Bursik and Grasmick
1993). The structure of wages, and the comparative advantage of illegal
wages relative to limited legal wages, also motivates such switching and
short-term decision making.32
Ecological models of foraging behavior (Stephens and Krebs 1986)
offer an insightful way to analyze the tendency for youths to engage in
both illegal and legal work activities, either simultaneously or by moving back and forth between them. These models apply economic opti- The "doubling up" of legal work and cocaine sales in the Fagan (1994) and Reuter,
MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) studies indicates that for many young men illegal work
may be temporary or transitional work that supplements difficult low-wage or otherwise
unsatisfactory work. For others, legal work provides options to riskier illegal work or
perhaps broadens markets for sellers of illegal goods or services.
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mizing analysis to the problems faced by animals that forage for food.
The animal must make several decisions in a short period of time:
whether it should "prey" on a particular food source it encounters or
turn that prey down to search for better prey; exploit opportunities in
a given patch or search for new opportunities, and so forth. The parallels with youths "foraging" for earnings, legal or illegal, are striking.
The youth must decide whether to engage in robbery, take a shortterm (and perhaps low-paying) job when he encounters an offer; steal
in the local community or try some adjoining area; sell drugs to employees, if working, or to customers in a street market. Empirical evidence of such short-term switching and career juggling is evident in
recent studies with prison inmates (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall
1995), drug sellers (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990; Fagan
1994), career property offenders (Decker and Wright 1995; Shover
1995), and robbers (Decker and Wright 1995).
The foraging models direct attention to differing "reservation
wages" of various money-making activities and their determinants.
When returns fall below the reservation wage, the youth will reject an
opportunity and go on to something different. Freeman (1992) showed
that young men in inner-city poverty areas encounter both illegal and
legal opportunities in a relevant (and short) time period: McDonald's
may be hiring this week; Jones Construction may need a laborer; robbers may need someone to fence stolen goods; an elderly woman may
wander along the wrong street; a car with an expensive stereo system
may be parked in an alley, etc. In a world where short-run legal and
illegal earnings opportunities arrive more or less randomly, it is natural
for individuals to move between them, commit crimes while working,
or take a legitimate job if one happens to be available even when engaged in criminal activities. If this hypothesis is correct, and the behavior of crime-prone youths is similar to that of foraging animals as opposed to that of adults with permanent careers, the supply of youths
to crime will be quite elastic, consistent with the observed failure of
incapacitation to reduce crime.
C. Research on Crime, Work, and Development
In addition to basic research, research in the contexts of policy experiments and interventions can provide data to understand problems
of crime and unemployment. Several topics deserve research attention.
1. Basic Research: Illegal Wages and Illegal Markets. There is little
consistent information on the diversity of illegal labor markets and ille-
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gal wages. There has been extensive research on drug selling, but drug
sellers are involved in a variety of illegal income-generating activities.
Research is needed that focuses on the economic lives of people active
in illegal markets. Studies are needed that examine market incentives
for illegal work and the economic and social dimensions of illegal work
that compete with the legal labor market. Similarly, research on illegal
markets is needed to explain demand for illegal work, especially the
social organization of illegal work and its opportunity structures. Basic
social processes including recruitment and the flow of capital also will
inform knowledge about the competing economic structures of crime.
a. Models of Decision Making. A fully specified model of economic decision making will provide necessary information on the cognitive processes leading to decisions to engage in illegal work. Similar models
have been developed by economists for addictions (Becker and Murphy
1988) and to specify deterrence of illegal behavior (Miller and Anderson 1986). Cognitive models of decision making also have been developed to explain involvement in violence (Dodge and Crick 1990), but
these focus less on economic variables than on strategic decision
making.
Perspectives from economic choice, opportunity, control, and labeling theories can be integrated in a conceptual framework of decision
making about work preferences and choices. Prior work experiences
should be included to measure conceptions of work and changes over
time in response to experiences in the workplace. Transitions from legal to illegal and back to legal work should be closely analyzed, as
should the difficult transitions from school to work and incarceration
to work. Samples should include several neighborhoods to assess the
mediating influences of peer networks and local economies. A range of
informal and formal economic activities should be specified, and data
collection points should occur with sufficient frequency to address the
close timing of work and crime decisions. Age cohorts should vary as
well, recognizing the varying places in the natural histories of crime
and work of people at different stages in the life course.
b. Employer-Employee Relationships. Conflicts in the workplace are
one barrier to employment for unskilled or semi-skilled young males
at the end of the job queues. These conflicts are the source of frequent
absenteeism and the discount on job quality that may influence decisions to turn to illegal work. Studies on the sources and outcomes of
conflicts in the workplace for inner-city youths are needed to help
fashion interventions to maintain job stability. This effort may be part

Crime and Work

279

of a larger qualitative research effort to understand the work experiences of young males who are at the cusp of decisions regarding legal
and illegal work. If conflicts are a source of attrition from the labor
force, the origins of and solutions to these conflicts have important implications for maintaining labor force attachments.
2. Policy Experiments. Research in applied settings provides laboratories for testing economic theories of crime and legal and illegal work.
There is the obvious intuitive appeal of jobs programs as an intervention to reduce criminality." When offenders can be put to work at sufficient wages to compete with illegal income, logic suggests that they
will desist from crime. Research is needed on the effects of increasing
market incentives for legal work (see Fagan 1992a, 1994; Freeman
1992, 1994; Grogger 1994, 1995, 1998). Pay scales would have to be
set to meet individual needs and to reflect market wages. The type of
work and occupational status are additional considerations (Matsueda
et al. 1992). Work outcomes are contingent on job quality, wages, and
the status accorded to particular types of work. Placement in unskilled
labor or work for work's sake may not attend to theoretically important
dimensions that the illegal market sometimes fulfills. Setting also is an
important dimension of work that merits additional research (Uggen,
Piliavin, and Matsueda 1992). Hostile work environments confront
many nonwhite males entering the workforce (see, e.g., Bourgois 1989,
1995; Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991), discounting the returns
from legal work by raising social and personal costs. Disputes in the
workplace between young minority males and white employers are all
too common (Ferguson and Filer 1986; Sullivan 1989; Anderson
1990), adding additional downward pressures on the returns from legal
work.
Age also will be an important variable in the relationship of work,
wages, and crime. For younger people, especially those who have
" Of course, an alternative policy would focus on reducing the returns from illegal
work to match wages for legal work. Current illegal work involves a diverse set of activities, but drug selling appears to be the most lucrative and widespread. Reducing the returns from drug selling would require either a decline in demand (an unlikely prospect
given the past two decades of drug crises in American cities), or the deregulation of
drugs and the substitution of market rules for legal controls. This has proven to be a
politically unpopular option and is not feasible in the short run. Experiments with increasing punishment costs over the past decade also have not stemmed participation in
violent crime but have been associated with declines in burglary rates. The connection
between incarceration rates and property or drug crime rates is tenuous at best, since
the bulk of those imprisoned have not been property crime offenders (Reiss and Roth
1993).
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avoided legal sanctions but who face uncertain futures in the labor
market, work experiences take place in the developmental context of
emerging human capital and school-to-work transitions. Older individuals have different motivations, shaped by the changing conceptions
of work and needs at later developmental stages. Having experienced
prison, perhaps they are more willing to discount the returns from illegal work in light of higher punishment costs and (if married) higher
commitment costs. Especially for those returning from prison, job
placements may be more important than skill development. Yet these
individuals face a scary list of obstacles: criminal labels, skill and human
capital deficits, and limited access to job networks. They are no doubt
at the end of the job queue for a shrinking demand for unskilled labor.
Racial preferences of employers also present an important contextual
factor in measuring work outcomes. This involves both initial hiring
decisions and termination decisions. Employers are quite open in their
racial hiring preferences (Wilson 1996). Their biases are based on perceptions of African American males as making "trouble" through
higher wage demands, poor productivity, frequent absenteeism, and
conflicts with coworkers and supervisors. However, discrimination in
hiring poses a formidable barrier to the development of initial job contacts and the human capital that accrues through employment. Firing
decisions also may reflect racial imbalance and bias.
The supported work experiments of the 1970s provided several lessons for moving offenders from crime to legal work. The analyses of
the TARP experiments suggest limited effects of supported work programs for ex-offenders but promising effects in the samples overall for
offenders whose human capital "protected" them from failure
(Needels 1994). Rethinking TARP to incorporate lessons from basic
research suggests the possibility of further experiments that include ancillary services as well as financial support and disaggregated interventions for older versus younger offenders.
The cessation of crime with age, and the return of many offenders
to legal work at the end of crime careers, suggests a final research context to understand the transition from crime to work. The processes of
reintegration from illegal work (Biernacki 1986; Adler 1993) require
social psychological adjustments to new roles and circumstances. Research on the natural history of desistance should focus on the economic contingencies and strategies that support that transition. This
would involve micro-study of the cognitive decisions and processes beginning with cohorts of offenders returning from prison or currently
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on parole or probation supervision. Measures would look closely at assessments of illegal and legal work in terms of both pecuniary and social "costs" and "payoffs," and the changes in self- and social identity
that accompany the shift away from deviant networks to the more predictable "straight" world.
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